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The challenge of 
the 1980s 
Enrique V. Iglesias 
This article reproduces, with a few changes, the 
Report which the author presented to the nineteenth 
session of CEPAL in his capacity as Executive Sec-
retary of the Commission. 
In the first part, he describes some of the main 
features of the international situation and the re-
gional scene at the beginning of the 1980s. With 
regard to the international situation, he stresses the 
dangers of the protectionism that is reappearing in 
the industrialized economies; with respect to the 
regional scene, he stresses the inconsistency be-
tween the expanding and increasingly diversified 
base of production and the continuation of unre-
solved distribution problems and social inade-
quacies. 
In the second part, he takes up two key concepts 
in the CEPAL theory of development—the centre-
per iphery system and industrialization— and uses 
them as guidelines for dealing with the problems of 
the present and the future. In so doing, he does not 
seek to make a retrospective eulogy of those con-
cepts , but rather to use them to interpret some of the 
pressing economic problems of the region, 
In the third part, he outlines the strategic prob-
lems of the coming years which, in his view, are 
those pertaining to international trade, external fi-
nancing, the energy transition and food security. 
In his final observations, he summarizes his vi-
sion: whilst it is very important to solve the external 
problems, it is on the domestic front that the ground-
work for the region's development must be laid. On 
this front, h e draws attention to three challenges: the 
reconciliation of economic and social efficiency, the 
modernization of private enterprise and of the State, 
and the bringing of all national policies into line with 
the criterion of integral development. 
*Executive Secretary of CEPAL. 
I 
The international situation 
and the regional economic 
scene 
A. THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC SCENE 
1. The main features of the 1970s 
Two years ago, in our statement at La Paz,1 we 
noted that the 1970s would be remembered for 
two main features: the culmination of a cycle of 
unprecedented growth begun in the 1950s, and 
the steep decline in that growth trend in the 
middle of the decade which had just ended. 
This is not the place to recall, much less to 
describe in detail, the analyses carried out from 
the widest variety of angles, including of 
course those made by CEPAL into the causes of 
the phenomenon. It is enough to repeat what 
we have said on many occasions: that the rises 
in petroleum prices as from 1973 cannot really 
be regarded as the decisive factor in this set-
back. It would not be right to exaggerate their 
importance or to overlook other relevant de-
velopments. In fact, these rises (which only 
represented the correction of the distortions 
which had mounted up over a long period 
in which world economic growth was based 
on an artificially abundant and cheap supply of 
petroleum) in one way strengthened and in 
another way reflected a number of upheavals 
which had begun to be manifested in the eco-
nomic evolution of the industrialized countries 
towards the end of the 1960s —in both the real 
and the financial spheres— and whose conse-
quences hit the developing countries with sin-
gular force. Further on we shall analyse these 
factors in greater detail. For the time being, 
however, we should like to confine ourselves to 
recalling their main characteristics. 
The first item of note is the persistence of 
the recessive situation which has characterized 
the world economy since 1974. From then until 
1979 the rate of world economic growth stood at 
1
 Enr ique V. Iglesias, "Latin America on the threshold 
of the 1980s", CEPAL Review, No. 9, December 1979. 
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about 3.5%, in contrast with that of close to 
5.5% recorded during the period 1960-1972. 
This rate was, moreover, markedly lower in the 
case of the developed market-economy coun-
tries. Naturally, this decline in the pace of eco-
nomic growth had a negative impact on the 
evolution of world trade, which had played a 
very dynamic role during the preceding period 
bu t which in the 1970s expanded at a rate of 
only around 5.5% annually, in comparison with 
the figure of 8% recorded during the preceding 
decade. 
Paradoxically, this drop in the growth rate 
was accompanied by a marked inflationary 
trend, the virulence ofwhich may be gauged by 
observing the rates of variation of price levels 
in the industrialized countries. These coun-
tries broke with their historic inflation rates, 
which were usually lower than 5% a year, to 
reach rates close to 10% annually from 1974 
onwards. The seeming paradox of this phe-
nomenon occurring during a period of reces-
sion becomes easier to understand if account is 
taken of some of the theses which CEPAL has 
been putt ing forward since the middle of the 
previous decade concerning the structural 
nature of some causes of inflationary processes. 
Thus , in addition to the rises designed to de-
termine more realistically the true social cost of 
petroleum and other basic commodities, other 
causes of the greater intensity and persistence 
of the inflationary processes involved the facil-
ity with which producers have been able to 
pass their cost increases on to the prices paid by 
consumers, the defects in price formation 
mechanisms in many sectors of economic ac-
tivity, the insufficient rise in the productivity of 
capital and manpower, and the rapid growth of 
international liquidity during recent years. 
This leads us to draw attention to a third 
characteristic in the economic pattern of the 
decade which has just ended, namely, that the 
economic difficulties of a structural nature 
which began to make themselves felt in some 
industrial centres early in the past decade., 
followed by the petroleum price adjustments at 
a later date, generated great disequilibria in the 
balance-of-payments current accounts of the 
majority of countries in the world as of 1974, so 
that it is estimated that the surplus on current 
account of the oil-exporting countries in 1980 
amounted to approximately US$ 115 billion, 
whi le the developing oil-importing countries 
and the industrialized economies recorded def-
icits of about US$ 70 billion and US$ 50 billion, 
respectively. It should be borne in mind that 
after the initial rises in the price of petroleum, 
this went down in real terms between 1975 and 
1978, and was adjusted again in the last two 
years, with the result that the petroleum-
exporting countries have managed to re-estab-
lish a current account surplus of similar pro-
portions to the maximum recorded by them in 
1974. 
These disequilibria have led to a signif-
icant process of redistribution of current 
account surpluses and deficits between the 
O P E C countries, the industrialized economies 
and the developing countries —a process 
which would not have been possible without 
the unusual growth of the international finan-
cial markets, which was brought on precisely 
by the disequilibria referred to. This does not 
mean that that extraordinarily large-scale 
redistribution has taken place automatically, or 
easily. On the contrary, in order to effect it, it 
was necessary to solve problems of great 
complexity, many of which had never before 
been experienced. At all events, the disequi-
libria recorded in the external accounts of the 
different countries and the mechanisms used to 
promote the mass redistribution of financial 
resources at the international level constituted 
another of the leading characteristics of the 
decade just ended. 
2. The prospects for the 1980s 
The persistence of the characteristics which 
determined the uneven evolution of the inter-
national economy during the past decade and 
its recent decline means that, in the best of 
cases, the prospects for the 1980s are mediocre 
and even, from a more realistic point of view, 
disturbing. Considering the two most probable 
scenarios, a recent report2 by the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) predicts annual economic growth 
2 See Facing the Future: Report of the OECD Interfu-
ture Project. 
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rates for the period 1980-1990 of 3.6% or 3.0%, 
depend ing on whether the dynamism of the 
world economy remains concentrated in the 
industrialized countries or is diffused to 
a greater extent towards the developing 
countries. In 1980 the World Bank, for its part, 
had to revise the estimates made the preceding 
year in this respect, lowering the rate of growth 
foreseen for the 1980s to 3.7% annually in the 
most optimistic or 'high growth' hypothesis and 
to only 3.0% in the 'low growth' hypothesis, 
which, moreover, the Bank regards as being the 
most probable. These estimates imply the con-
tinuation of the weak rate of expansion of the 
world economy recorded during the past de-
cade and even entertain the possibility that 
growth will decelerate. 
These projections are explained by the 
structural nature of the factors behind this 
trend. I believe that by now the perplexity 
about their cyclical or long-standing character 
should have been cleared up. These are trends 
which originated in difficulties affecting those 
factors which have so far constituted the driving 
force behind world economic growth, and they 
make themselves felt essentially in the indus-
trialized countries. This is reflected in the per-
sistent drop in labour productivity and invest-
ment ; the slow growth of the process of capital 
formation; the declining profitability of invest-
ment , as seen in the small share accounted for 
by profits in national income; the obstacles 
which the process of technological innovation 
runs up against in some countries, and the 
appearance of idle capacity in a growing num-
ber of key industrial sectors. Taken together, 
these factors are responsible for the gradual 
loss of competitiveness of some industrialized 
countries compared with their more efficient 
partners and even with an increasing number 
of developing countries. They are also forcing 
them to tackle a process of '^industrialization' 
a imed at modernizing those branches of pro-
duction which have become less competitive 
and adjusting their economies to the new costs 
of energy and environmental protection. In 
turn, this is giving rise to a world-level process 
of industrial redeployment towards some 
countries on the periphery. 
Although in the main developed eco-
nomies these trends were in effect even prior to 
the petroleum crisis, the rise in prices and the 
insecurity as regards supplies of this fuel and 
other strategic raw materials have been par-
tially responsible for creating rigidities on the 
supply side which adversely affect the smooth 
functioning of the production systems of the 
industrial countries. 
These rigidities are heightened by the fact 
already referred to that the economies of the 
industrialized countries have been subject 
to continuous inflationary pressures, even 
though their growth has been slow and their 
unemployment rates very high. Moreover, 
these inflationary pressures remained even 
during the period 1975-1978, when there were 
no rises in the prices of petroleum. These pres-
sures, in their turn, have introduced an element 
of greater caution in the management of these 
economies, which is reflected in a general re-
luctance to adopt policies aimed at returning to 
normal levels of economic activity. 
The structural nature of this situation 
becomes even more evident if it is borne in 
mind that these trends are rooted in the po-
litical, social and cultural conditioning fac-
tors created when the industrial societies 
themselves were expanding and developing 
and are especially a result of changes in the 
values or preferences of the public, the labour 
force and consumers. Thus, it is obvious that 
the emphasis on the quality of life in com-
parison with purely material progress, the 
quest for greater personal and community ful-
filment, and the concern for the preservation of 
the environment in industrial societies have a 
strong influence on the direction and intensity 
of their development processes. 
In these circumstances, it is not surprising 
that so thorough a break with the course 
followed by the world economy since the end 
of the war poses problems, which cannot be 
adequately explained in the light of conven-
tional economic wisdom and that it has led 
to disconcerting perplexities, impassioned 
debate and revisionist movements arising from 
completely opposite approaches. 
According to some of these schools of 
thought, we are said to be living in a post-
Keynesian period, in which the problems of the 
industrialized economies can no longer be re-
solved by formulas aimed at increasing effec-
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tive demand through macroeconomic policies 
which imply massive intervention on the part 
of the State. Thus, other schools have recently 
emerged which stress aspects related to 'sup-
ply', whether in the sense of the higher costs 
associated with the use of non-renewable 
resources such as petroleum and with the pres-
ervation of the environment, or in the sense of 
the rigidities introduced by the new prefer-
ences of the labour force, or, finally, as regards 
the limitations placed on the mobilization of 
resources for investment due to wage increases 
and the need to allocate such resources, in fact, 
to activities related to energy, the development 
of natural resources and environmental protec-
tion. From another angle, we see the develop-
ment of a controversy of worldwide scope, 
which is particularly lively in the case of Latin 
America, concerning the justification, areas 
and limits which should be assigned to public 
management in the economy vis-à-vis the role 
of market mechanisms. 
T h e emergence of and the struggles be-
tween different schools of economic thought 
are the natural reaction to a period charac-
terized by change, turbulence and uncer-
tainties which the world had not experienced 
for at least the past 25 years. The fact that, 
beyond the recessive or inflationary syn-
drome associated with the enormous financial 
disequilibria which characterized the past 
decade, there are also structural trends such as 
those I have just described in action, makes us 
think that we are dealing with a long-standing, 
rather than a cyclical process, which cannot be 
understood or handled on the basis of conven-
tional formulas and categories of analysis. If 
this is true, then even in the best of cases the 
turbulent decade which is now ending is bound 
to be followed by a period of transition in which 
the world economy must face very profound 
structural changes. 
B. T H E REGIONAL ECONOMIC SCENE 
T h e sombre and uncertain prospects which are 
to be glimpsed on the international scene pre-
sent a difficult challenge for the development 
of Latin America in the decade now beginning 
and, in particular, during its first five years. 
Nevertheless, when analysing the options 
open to the region during this period, it is 
necessary to assess not only the external and 
internal factors which will tend to restrict its 
economic and social growth, but also those 
factors which will facilitate its advance, for 
there can be no doubt that in its attempts to 
progress in the threefold and basic task of 
achieving a development process which is at 
once more equitable, dynamic and autono-
mous, Latin America now has greater assets 
than in the past, although at the same time it 
is limited by the persistence or increase of 
old restrictions and the emergence of new 
problems. 
Naturally, obvious personal and time limi-
tations prevent me on this occasion from 
drawing up a systematic balance sheet of the 
factors which favour or obstruct the progress 
of the region towards more advanced states 
of economic and social development. And 
obviously, too, any balance sheet of this kind 
would have to take due account of the different 
incidence or weight of these positive or nega-
tive elements in each one of the very diverse 
national situations present in the region. 
In spite of these limitations —of which we 
are very much aware— allow me to present 
some background information and opinions 
on four main aspects of the recent pattern of 
development of Latin America which, together 
with others which we will consider in greater 
detail at the end of our report, will, in our opin-
ion, have a very strong impact on the region's 
evolution in the decade on which we are now 
embarking. These four aspects are the am-
bivalent characteristics of the social develop-
ment achieved; economic growth and its 
effects on Latin America's capacity to adapt to 
external contingencies; the process of expan-
sion and diversification of exports, and the 
problems raised by the intensification and 
spread of inflationary processes throughout the 
region. 
1. The ambivalent features of social 
development 
Two years ago, when I analysed the great 
challenges which, in my view, Latin America 
would have to face up to during this decade 
(see footnote 1), I drew attention first to the 
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chal lenge of improving the social irradiation of 
economic growth so as to advance in the vital 
task of eradicating critical poverty and building 
societies in which income and, above all, 
opportunities are distributed more equitably. 
I now wish to reaffirm that opinion and also 
reiterate the conviction I expressed then that in 
economies which have attained a degree of 
development such as those of Latin America, 
the vanquishing of extreme poverty constitutes 
a perfectly possible mission, so that, at least 
from a strictly economic point of view, there is 
no justification for the survival of vexing situa-
tions of neediness and for a failure to satisfy 
basic needs, such as those for food, health and 
education. 
To say that a mission is possible certainly 
does not mean (and this should be reiterated) 
that it is easy. Quite the contrary, since it would 
be naive to overlook the gigantic organizational 
efforts which it would have to be made at all 
levels and the unwavering political will which 
it would be necessary to summon up and sus-
tain in order to reorientate the development 
process in such a way that it would be possible 
to advance quickly and steadily in the great task 
of eliminating both the most pressing manifes-
tations of extreme poverty and its main causes. 
T h e enormous magnitude of this challenge 
is easier to grasp if account is taken of the deep-
rooted and complex nature of the factors re-
sponsible for poverty and inequality in our 
countries. It must be recalled that, with few 
exceptions, Latin American societies have 
traditionally been characterized by situations 
of acute inequality in the distribution of 
income and wealth and in access to opportu-
nities, And it is also necessary to recall that the 
deepes t roots of that inequality are connected 
with such transcendental far-off but long-
lasting historic phenomena as the rise and 
consolidation —during the Conquest and 
throughout the long colonial period— of highly 
stratified and structurally inequitable soci-
et ies. 
Naturally, the causes and manifestations of 
the inequality inherited from the colonial 
per iod were gradually modified in the century 
which followed Independence, during which 
the incidence of servile forms of work was 
at tenuated, slavery was eliminated, and the 
majority of our countries began to be integrated 
into the new international economy, receiving 
to their greater or lesser benefit the impulse of 
the dynamic forces generated by the Industrial 
Revolution. Those changes were consolidated 
over the past 50 years as the pattern of develop-
ment altered, the pace of rural-urban migration 
s tepped up, State economic and social action 
was considerably expanded and diversified, 
and their forms of insertion in the outside world 
were transformed. 
In spite of these and other changes which, 
in general, helped to lighten the consequences 
of inequality and altered the level and charac-
teristics of development, the concentration of 
income and wealth remained substantial. 
Thus , in accordance with the most recent cal-
culations referring to seven countries which 
together represent nearly 80% of the popula-
tion and slightly over 90% of the product of 
Latin America,3 it is estimated that in 1975 the 
richest 10% of the households were receiving 
slightly more than 47% of the total income, 
whi le the poorest 40% of the households did 
not even receive 8%. The high degree of 
inequality revealed by these figures becomes 
even more striking if the average incomes of 
the two groups are compared, for the average 
income of the first group was over 24 times that 
of the second group in 1975. 
T h e most sobering fact brought out by 
these figures, however, is that between 1960 
and 1975 inequality, far from being attenuated, 
increased in that the share of the income 
received by the poorest 40% of the population 
fell slightly and the share of the 10% of the 
population in the richest group and that of the 
20% in the group just below the richest rose 
slightly (see table 1). 
It is true that because these changes in the 
direction of greater inequality took place 
during a period of rapid economic growth, they 
were accompanied by increases in the absolute 
income of all groups, including those at the 
bottom of the distribution scale. But these 
increases were very different in each case. 
While the average income of the poorest 40% of 
households rose by less than US$130 (at 1970 
3These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela. 
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Table 1 
LATIN AMERICA: HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN THE REGION 
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 CEPAL estimates on the basis of national surveys for seven countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru 
and Venezuela). 
'' Corresponds to the concept ot disposable income per household, estimated on the basis oí the national accounts of each 
country. 
values) during this period, that of the richest 
10% rose by nearly US$4 700. In other words, 
whi le the poor were only slightly less poor in 
1975 than in 1960, the rich became much richer 
be tween those years. 
Nevertheless, if we wish to gain a fuller 
picture of the social development which has 
occurred in Latin America during the last few 
decades, some additional data must be taken 
into account. It must be borne in mind that 
al though income constitutes the main determi-
nant of standards of living and well-being, 
these also depend on other variables which 
may evolve independently and even diver-
gently from income. Among these variables, 
three which have a decisive effect on the 
quality of life and, above all, on the oppor-
tunities people have to improve their living 
conditions are education, health and nutrition. 
Therefore, no social development analysis can 
fail to examine and assess the way in which 
these variables have evolved. 
On carrying out this taks, it must be 
concluded that in the great majority of our 
countries there have been advances which, 
although not all of them have been as rapid as 
might have been desired, have been significant 
and have had a positive impact on distribution. 
Let us consider first the evolution of some 
of the basic indicators which describe the edu-
cational situation in Latin America. As may be 
seen from table 2, for the region as a whole the 
rate of enrolment of children from 6 to 11 years 
was slightly over 57% en 1960, while two de-
cades later it was over 82%. During this period, 
progress was even more rapid in the case of 
adolescents from 12 to 17 years, whose enrol-
ment coefficient nearly doubled, rising from 
35% to 63%. Where progress was truly explo-
sive, however, was in the case of the enrolment 
of young people between the ages of 18 and 23 
studying in institutions of higher education, for 
be tween 1960 and 1980 this rate increased 
more than fourfold, rising from slightly over 6% 
to 26%. 
It should be emphasized that this increase 
in rates of enrolment was not only rapid but also 
widespread, in that it occurred at all three 
levels of education in all the countries of the 
region. 
Thanks to these advances, the enrolment 
of children from 6 to 11 is now close to total not 
only in Argentina, Barbados and Guyana —in 
all of which it was very high already in 1960— 
but also in Costa Rica, Chile, Cuba and Jamai-
ca, where 20 years ago it fluctuated in the 
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neighbourhood of 75%. Progress has been even 
more rapid in relative terms in countries such 
as Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia and Honduras, 
where in 1960 over half of the children from 6 to 
11 were not enrolled in basic education, 
whereas today the figure enrolled is between 
70% and 77%, while progress is still more 
notable in Panama, whose coefficient rose from 
68% to 96%, and above all in Mexico, where it 
climbed from 58% to 94%. 
Analysis of the rates of enrolment of ado-
lescents from 12 to 17 years of age and of young 
people from 18 to 23 years shows equally sig-
nificant progress which, for reasons of time, I 
shall refrain from describing but which is 
clearly indicated by the figures in table 2. 
There are, however, two additional con-
siderations which I consider it indispensable to 
dwell on in order that the profound signifi-
cance of the rapid and widespread advance re-
flected in these statistics may be appreciated. 
The first of these is that the significant rise 
in all these coefficients took place in a period in 
which the young population of Latin America 
was soaring. For this reason, it would have 
required a very considerable increase in abso-
lute terms in the resources allocated to the 
education sector just to maintain the enrolment 
rates. The fact that in these circumstances those 
coefficients should have risen markedly in 
nearly every country is an indication of the 
magnitude of the truly praiseworthy effort 
Table 2 





























































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of UNESCO data. 
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made not only by the governments of the region 
bu t by Latin American society as a whole. 
T h e second observation is no less impor-
tant and is related to the redistribution aspects 
of this expansion of the education system and 
in particular to its implications for equality of 
opportunity. This significant increase in the 
coverage of education has implications which 
are clearly favourable from the point of view of 
distribution, in that it benefits mostly and in 
some cases exclusively the middle sectors and 
the relatively poorer groups of the population. 
T h e reason for this is simple but fundamental: 
for a long time the overwhelming majority of 
the children of the rich have completed their 
basic education, a very high proportion of them 
have completed their secondary education, and 
a much higher percentage of them than of 
children from middle-income and especially 
low-income households have entered institu-
tions of higher learning. Consequently, the 
broadening of the coverage of the education 
system systematically favours those who pre-
viously had no access to it, that is to say, depen-
ding on national circumstances and the levels 
of education in question, primarily the children 
of poor or middle-income families. 
Very similar considerations apply with 
respect to the participation of high, middle and 
low-income groups in the social progress re-
flected by the evolution of a basic health indi-
cator such as infant mortality. Here again it may 
be noted that significant and widespread prog-
ress has been made, with the result that in the 
region as a whole the infant mortality rate has 
dropped from 105 per thousand in the first half 
of the 1960s to 73 per thousand in the second 
half of the last decade (see table 3). And here 
again it is apparent that this advance is due 
primarily and virtually exclusively to the im-
provement of the situation of the poorer groups, 
since for many years previously the richer sec-
tors, including the middle-income sectors, had 
the resources to keep their children from dying 
before they were a year old. 
If, for the sake of brevity, our final consid-
eration is that relating to a major indicator of 
nutrition such as the supply of calories as a 
percentage of average requirements, the pic-
ture which emerges is similar, as are, to some 
extent, its social implications. As may be seen 
from table 4, between the beginning of the 
1960s and the middle of the past decade the 
respective coefficients rose in all the 19 Latin 
American countries for which information is 
available, and in 11 of them their value was 
over 100% during the last period referred to. Of 
course, as it is true of all averages, this one says 
nothing about the differences which may exist 
at a given moment between the coefficients 
corresponding to the different socio-economic 
strata, but even so the increase over time must 
have been due primarily to the rise in the coef-
ficients of the groups in the lower half of the 
distribution scale,.since on the one hand —to 
repeat an observation made earlier— it is rea-
sonable to suppose that the other groups 
have long been meeting their basic calory 
needs , and on the other, the increase in con-
sumption of the higher groups, outside of cer-
tain limits, runs counter to obvious restrictions 
of a biological nature. 
Table 3 
LATIN AMERICA: INFANT MORTALITY 


































































Source: CELADE, on the basis of official information. 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA: CALORY INTAKE AS 







































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of data from FAO and WHO. 
Naturally, recognition of the advances 
shown by the statistical data analysed and a 
description of their favourable implications 
with regard to distribution is no indication 
whatsoever —and stress must: be laid on this 
point— that the progress made in fields like 
education, health and nutrition is sufficient. 
Much less is it intended to imply that the pres-
ent situation is satisfactory. Nothing could be 
further from our intention or. from our way of 
viewing the problem. As we pointed out at the 
beginning of our observations, we still think 
that the achievement of a better social distri-
but ion of the fruits of economic growth should 
constitute the main objective of development 
policies in Latin America. And this conviction 
is born of an examination of the socio-economic 
situation which prevails in our countries, 
which in the majority of cases —and notwith-
standing the progress attained— suffers from 
gaps and disequilibria which are not only 
ethically unacceptable but are also economi-
cally unjustifiable in Latin America today. 
2. Growth and transformation of the economy 
and greater defence capacity of the region 
In our addresses in Port of Spain, Guatemala 
City and La Paz, we analysed the substantial 
growth and the considerable transformation of 
the economy of Latin America during the past 
30 years and pointed out that these develop-
ments help to explain what we call the greater 
defence capacity of the region in dealing with 
contingencies coming from the exterior. 
To judge the magnitude and unity of 
this growth and transformation process, it is 
enough to repeat that in the course of the past 
three decades the total product of Latin Ameri-
ca increased fivefold in real terms while that of 
manufacturing rose more than sixfold. At the 
same time —and in particular during the pre-
vious decade, agriculture advanced consider-
ably and showed substantial diversification, 
financial activities were expanded and mod-
ernized, and the investment coefficient rose 
gradually but persistently. Of even greater 
importance, however, is that over those 30 
years —and again with greater force in recent 
years— both the education level and the skills 
structure of the labour force improved mar-
kedly in virtually all the countries of the region. 
As a result of these advances and changes, 
Latin America now has a broader, more highly 
diversified and flexible production base than in 
the past. And, in turn, as a consequence of this 
structural transformation, there has been an 
increase in the region's capacity both to meet 
sudden challenges from the external economic 
situation and to seize the opportunities offered 
by the changing international scenario. 
Since in our previous statements we have 
pointed to some of the many developments 
which reflect these new and more favourable 
structural characteristics of the Latin American 
economy, on this occasion we wish to put our 
emphasis primarily on the significance of two 
events of recent years which in our view, 
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constitute new and important indications of 
that increased capacity for defence and adapta-
tion available to the region today. 
The first of these is the relatively high eco-
nomic dynamism displayed by Latin America 
over the last two years. As may be seen from 
table 5, the region's overall economic growth 
rate, after falling to a level of only 3.3% in 1975 
because of the international crisis that year and 
oscillating in the neighbourhood of 4.8% for the 
next three years, was nearly 6% in the period 
1979-1980. 
I t is true that this rate was achieved partly 
because of the marked elevation of external 
indebtedness in the majority of Latin American 
countries. It is also true that it was slightly more 
than one point below the very high economic 
growth rate achieved by the region, on average, 
dur ing the period 1970-1974. 
To asses its real significance, however, it is 
necessary to bear in mind the very different 
circumstances which prevailed on the interna-
tional economic scene at the beginning of the 
previous decade and during the past two years. 
In the former period, both the production of the 
industrialized economies and world trade were 
in full expansion, and this acted as a powerful 
stimulus for the growth of the economies of the 
periphery. 
During the bienrrium 1979-1980, however, 
as we have already pointed out, the situation 
was very different. On the one hand, economic 
activity in the industrialized countries grew by 
only a little over 3% in 1979 and by only 1.5% in 
1980, while it grew much more slowly in the 
case of the United States, which is well known 
to have special influence on the export possi-
bilities and ultimately on the economic growth 
Table 5 
LATIN AMERICA: EVOLUTION OF THE GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 

















































































































































































Source: CEPAL, on the basis of official figures. 
"Preliminary estimates, subject to revision. 
Growth rates relate to the material product. 
c1971-1974. 
dExcluding Cuba. 
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of many countries of the region. On the other 
hand, this sluggish behaviour of the industrial-
ized economies and the marked protectionist 
trends discernible in not a few of them were 
partially responsible for the perceptible reduc-
tion in the dynamism of world trade, thereby 
limiting the possibilities for Latin American 
exports to expand further. Thus, after in-
creasing at an average rate of approximately 
5.5% during the period 1977-1979, the volume 
of world trade rose by barely 1% in 1980.4 
Although the main cause of this marked reduc-
tion in the growth rate of world trade was the 
drop of 10% in the volume of petroleum ex-
ports, it was also due to the much slower ex-
pansion of exports of both manufactures and 
agricultural commodities in 1980. 
Actually, the notable decline in the dy-
namism of the world economy in 1980 is elo-
quently demonstrated by the fact that during 
that year four key variables (total production, 
industrial production, total trade and trade in 
manufactures) grew at the lowest rates record-
ed in the past quarter century, with the sole 
exception of those for 1958 and 1975. 
Thus, it is in this external context charac-
terized by slower growth both of the economic 
activity of the centre countries and of the vol-
ume of world trade that consideration should 
be given to the economic advance of the order 
of 6% annually achieved by the region during 
the period since our meeting in La Paz early in 
1979. 
And it is also in the context of that very 
changing international scene, which was in 
general more unfavourable than that which 
prevailed up to 1973, that we should analyse 
the second main fact to which I wish to refer, 
i.e., the notable expansion and increasing 
diversification of Latin American exports 
during the past decade. 
3. The expansion and diversification of exports 
In 1970 the region exported goods to a total 
value of US$14.3 billion; by 1980 these sales 
had increased well over sixfold, amounting to 
close to US$ 92 billion. Naturally, this increase 
4
 See GATT, Press Release, 10 March 1981, p. 1. 
is partly a reflection of the effects of interna-
tional inflation —which bore some of the re-
sponsibility for raising the dollar prices of 
many products exported by the region— and 
partly the result of the repeated and substantial 
rises in international petroleum prices since 
1973. Nevertheless, it also constitutes a clear 
demonstration of the increasing capacity of 
Latin America to place its products on the 
world market. If from the region as a whole we 
exclude the oil-exporting countries, and if in-
stead of considering the value of the sales we 
consider their volume, in short, if we analyse 
the volume of exports of the non-oil-exporting 
countries, we find that over the past decade it 
increased by 111%. What is more significant 
however, is that the growth rate of the volume 
of exports of those countries rose from an 
average of 4.8% during the five-year period 
1971-1975 to one of 8.7% in the next five years. 
In other words, the rate of expansion of the real 
external sales of the non-oil-exporting econ-
omies of the region increased very sharply 
precisely during the period in which the dy-
namism of the industrialized economies, which 
have traditionally constituted the main markets 
for Latin American exports, weakened. 
Moreover, the significant and steady in-
crease in external sales of the region has been 
accompanied by a gradual and considerable 
diversification in their structure. An eloquent 
indicator of this trend has been the growing 
participation of exports of manufactures and 
semi-manufactures in Latin America's total 
sales. Thus, in 1965 this share was only 8.5%, 
but five years later it had already climbed to 
15%, and in 1978 —the last year for which fig-
ures are available it again increased substan-
tially, reaching nearly 26% of the total value of 
exports of goods. 
The trend towards export diversification is 
also clearly shown if we observe, first, the evo-
lution of the relative share of the principal ex-
port product in the total external sales of each 
country and, second, the share of non-tradi-
tional exports. Thus, whilst the relative weight 
of the principal export product has declined in 
the large majority of the economies of the re-
gion, there has been an increase in the percent-
age of total external sales represented by ex-
ports of a large number of goods which were 
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previously sold only on the domestic market or 
were not even produced locally. 
Notable examples of this dual and simulta-
neous process are found in the exporting expe-
riences of economies as dissimilar as those of 
Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic and 
Uruguay. 
In the first of these countries, coffee in 
1970 still represented over 34% of total exports 
of goods, while in the same year manufactured 
products constituted less than a quarter. In 
1980, on the other hand, the share of coffee had 
dropped to approximately 12.5% while that of 
industrial goods had risen to nearly 57%. 
At the begining of the past decade, cop-
per generated three-quarters of Chile's total 
external sales, whilst the so-called non-tra-
ditional exports contributed less than 8%. 
Ten years later, the relative share of copper 
had fallen to about 45% whereas the value of 
non-traditional exports had increased almost 
19-fold to over a third of the total value ex-
ported. 
In 1970, over 70% of the export earnings of 
the Dominican Republic came from sales of 
sugar, coffee and cocoa, and the first of those 
commodities alone brought in nearly half the 
total value of the country's exports. Sales of 
non-traditional products, on the other hand, 
generated only 12% of the value exported. By 
1980 the picture had changed radically. Thanks 
to the inclusion of gold, ferronickel and other 
products in the export pattern, the relative 
share of non-traditional exports had risen to 
over 45% and thus was slightly larger than the 
combined share of sugar, coffee and cocoa. 
Finally, in Uruguay, traditional export 
products such as meat, wool, leather and 
l inseed oil accounted for nearly 80% of the total 
value of exports in 1970, with the other exports 
generating the remaining fifth. A decade later 
the share of the traditional products had fallen 
to under 40% and was thus far surpassed by the 
60% made up of non-traditional exports. 
4. The acceleration and spread of inflation 
However, along with advances such as those 
recorded in the level and compositions of ex-
ports, there have been serious setbacks in 
recent years. One of the gravest of these has 
been the intensification and spread of the prob-
lem of inflation, whose disturbing conse-
quences for the management of short-term 
economic policy and negative effects on eco-
nomic growth, income distribution and even on 
political stability and social order can certainly 
not be underestimated. 
It is well known that in the course of the 
past decade inflation became more persistent, 
intense and hard to handle virtually every-
where in the world. Thus, in the industrialized 
countries the disconcerting phenomenon of 
stagflation emerged, which it has not been pos-
sible to explain at the theoretical level, much 
less to deal with successfully at the practical 
level by economic policy. Naturally, this ac-
centuation of inflationary processes in the cen-
tral economies and the sharp rises in interna-
tional fuel prices which occurred in the middle 
and at the end of the past decade had a decisive 
effect on the rate of increase of prices in the 
majority of countries of the region. Thus, con-
tinuous and virulent inflationary processes 
have in recent years become a characteristic 
feature of the Latin American economic scene. 
All this is well known. It is, however, fre-
quently forgotten how different the situation 
which the region is facing in this regard is at 
present in comparison with that which pre-
vailed in it only 10 years ago. 
Up until the beginning of the past decade 
high and persistent inflation affected only the 
economies of the Southern Cone and to a lesser 
extent, that of Brazil. In the rest of the conti-
nent, inflationary processes were either mod-
erate —as in Colombia, Mexico and Peru— or 
virtually non-existent —as in Venezuela and the 
majority of the Central American and Carib-
bean economies. In 1970, for example, 13 coun-
tries, or over half of the 22 for which informa-
tion is available, experienced price rises of 
under 4.5%, and in five others the price level 
rose by less than 10%. In fact, in that year only 
Brazil and the Southern Cone countries had 
2-digit inflation, and the maximum increase in 
prices in the region —which occurred in Chile— 
was one of 35%. The simple average rate of 
inflation in Latin America —without consider-
ing the three southern countries— was thus 
barely 4%. 
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Four years later, the inflationary panorama 
had changed radically as a result of increased 
inflation in the industrialized countries and the 
considerable readjustment of petroleum prices 
adopted by the OPEC countries at the end of 
1973. Thus , in 1974 there was no longer any 
country in Latin America in which prices rose 
less than 10%, so that 2-digit inflation became 
the rule. What is more, in half of the Latin 
American economies the rate of inflation fluc-
tuated between 15% and 30% whereas in five 
other countries prices rose by between 30% 
and 40%. The simple average rate of inflation in 
Latin America —again excluding the Southern 
Cone countries, in all of which prices rose with 
much greater intensity— was 22% that year, or 
exactly five times as high as the average re-
corded in 1970. 
In the following years the rate of price in-
creases tended to become more moderate but 
was far from returning to the low levels which 
had prevailed up to the beginning of the de-
cade. For example, in 1978 the average rate of 
inflation was 17.5%, which while considerably 
T h e view of the world and regional scene 
which I have just outlined raises complex ques-
tions as regards the future course of the region's 
development and the most appropriate guide-
lines for and means of tackling it. 
In order to answer these questions we 
think that it would be useful to take as a guide 
what have been considered to be the idées-
force of the CEPAL approach. We shall do so 
with a view to the questions of today and tomor-
row, without pausing for retrospective consid-
erations, on which there is ample documen-
tation. 
Whatever our points of view, we believe 
that they should above all be governed by a 
large dose of humility. The mayor changes in 
lower than that recorded for 1974 was never-
theless nearly four times as high as that for 
1970. 
But this improvement, in addition to being 
modest, was transitory. The situation worsened 
again in 1979 when the inflation rate began to 
rise again in the central economies and the in-
ternational price of hydrocarbons in real terms 
again increased. Thus, during that year and also 
in 1980 the inflationary panorama was similar 
to that prevailing in 1974. In fact, last year the 
rate of inflation was under 10% in only three 
countries, while in another 11 economies —all 
of them characterized in the past by the notable 
stability of their price levels— the rise in con-
sumer prices fluctuated between 14% and 24%. 
T h e intensity of the inflationary process was 
even greater in Colombia, Jamaica, Mexico and 
Chi le , where prices rose by close to 30%, and 
higher still in Uruguay (43%) and Peru (61%). 
T h e highest rates of inflation, however, were 
recorded in Argentina and Brazil, where con-
sumer prices increased by approximately 90% 
during the year. 
development and their uncertain eventual 
concrete results call for prudence and the rejec-
tion of all dogmatic pretensions. However, it 
would be unpardonable for caution to inhibit 
us from doing our duty of establishing hypoth-
eses and suggesting guidelines for venturing 
into the unknown territory glimpsed ahead. 
As is generally known, the root of CEPAL's 
institutional thinking lies in its ideas on the 
centre-periphery system and industrializa-
tion, the latter taken in its broadest sense. 
T h e two are closely related, and their recipro-
cal characteristics and influences are indispen-
sable elements both for an overall appreciation 
of economic development and for under-
standing the most decisive question; the de-
gree of social spread of this process. 
II 
Centre periphery relations and the industrialization 
process in the context of the present situation 
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A. T H E CENTRE-PERIPHERY SYSTEM 
1. Basic concepts and relationships 
As regards the first point, it seems obvious that 
the centre and the periphery continue to exist 
in the world setup, differentiated by their in-
ternal structures and by the nature and conse-
quences of the relations between them. 
I have already stressed the changes and 
progress which have taken place in the struc-
ture of production of our countries, and the 
ways in which they have changed their forms of 
external relationships. However, it should be 
recognized that to a considerable extent they 
cont inue to take part in the international 
scheme of division of labour as producers of 
primary goods, which still account for over 70% 
of their exports. This has given rise to what has 
been described as the structural asymmetry of 
export and import patterns, since a decisive 
factor in the latter —quantitatively and quali-
tatively speaking— is constituted by industrial 
goods, a disassociation which naturally differs 
manifestly from that observed between the 
structures of exports and imports in the central 
economies. 
The world trade system thus continues to 
expose the region to repeated current account 
disequilibria, erratic behaviour of the supply of 
and demand for primary exports, the restric-
tions raised by new and old forms of protection-
ism in the central economies, and an adverse or 
inadequate evolution of the terms of trade. 
As regards the latter, the increase in the 
prices for oil —which only benefitted a few of 
the area's economies— and other commodities 
at the start of the 1970s led some people to think 
that a new future of sustained improvement of 
the terms of trade was opening up, in favour of 
our main exports. In actual fact, however, this 
has not come to pass to the extent expected, and 
the terms of trade have continued to advance 
and retreat fairly erratically. 
On the other hand, no substantial change 
seems to have occurred in other reflections of 
Latin America's special links with the central 
economies. Technological subordination is 
one of these and the most durable, although in 
this field, too, progress may be observed, par-
ticularly in the countries in which the diversi-
fication of production has made most progress. 
The flow of direct investment —which is 
usually considered to be a primordial mecha-
nism for the spread of technical progress— has 
continued to be centralized in the industrial-
ized economies, helping to widen the 'produc-
tivity gap' arising out of the uneven possibil-
ities of accumulation and innovation of the two 
universes. In recent years this gap has been 
called in question owing to the industrial crisis 
and the decline in the growth rate of produc-
tivity in an increasing number of activities in 
the industrial countries. At all events, between 
the mid-1960s (1966-1967) and the mid-1970s 
(1975), accumulated direct investment rose 
from around US$ 70 billion to US$ 186.5 billion 
in the developed countries, and from US$ 18.4 
to US$ 37.6 billion in Latin America, of which 
half was based in Brazil and Mexico. 
Despite these manifest facts, it is not su-
perfluous to repeat that they emerge in con-
nexion with a regional economy which has 
been substantially transformed and strength-
ened in recent decades. Although this state-
ment is valid to very different extents in the 
different countries and is subject to various 
types of reservations, it seems clear that the 
change covers the majority of countries and the 
majority of the population of Latin America. 
This is decisively due to the structural con-
sequences of the period characterized by what 
is known as 'inward-directed development', 
and particularly the progress in industrializa-
tion. This factor has also had a direct or indirect 
impact on achievements involving the diversi-
fication of the patterns of external trade, and 
particularly on the proportion of manufactured 
or agro-industrial exports. 
This phenomenon is one of the primordial 
reasons for the advantageous position of Latin 
America in the periphery setup. According to 
United Nations information, this may be sum-
med up in the fact that its per capita product at 
the end of the 1970s was close on four times that 
of the rest of the developing world. However, it 
is no less significant thai the regional level in 
this regard was slightly less than a fifth of that of 
the industrialized economies. In other words, 
although these changes had caused the centre 
to become less monolithic than in the past and 
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the developing countries less peripheral, there 
can be no doubt that the Latin American econ-
omies continued to be closer to the periphery 
than to the centre, although this situation re-
quires further clarification as regards the status 
of some particular countries or specific social 
groups. 
From another standpoint, I should like to 
reiterate the opinion I formulated before, that 
all of this has contributed to a greater defence 
capacity in the region vis-à-vis external events. 
Despi te the significant and generally dam-
aging repercussions of the upsets on the inter-
national scene, Latin America has been able to 
guard itself against them to an extent which 
certainly has no parallel with the traumatic 
consequences which these upsets used to 
inflict in the past. 
Briefly, and to sum up, then, although the 
Latin American economies continue to be part 
of the periphery in the international division of 
labour, they are no longer the same —struc-
turally— as in the period of 'outward-directed 
growth', even as regards their degree of auton-
omy (or dependency) vis-à-vis the exterior. 
2. The centre-periphery scheme and the new 
background for the world dialogue 
But it is not only Latin America which has 
changed m the course of the last decade; the 
world, too, has changed, and along with it the 
forms of interaction of the central and periph-
eral countries. This obliges us to study these 
changes more closely. 
The most important modifications which 
have taken place include: 
— the increasing multi-polarity which has 
emerged among the centres. This has been ag-
gravated by the progressive dispersal of eco-
nomic power within the western capitalist 
world —where leadership has begun to be 
shared between the United States, the Euro-
pean Community and Japan instead of the clear 
hegemony of one of these which dominated the 
postwar period until the end of the 1960s— and 
by the growing diversification within the so-
cialist sphere; 
— the end of the persistent and note-
worthy expansionary trend experienced by the 
industrialized countries following the postwar 
period and the start of a period of upsets, 
uncertainty and transition, originating in 
structural causes to which I have already re-
ferred; 
— the drop in the formerly very high 
growth rate of the centrally-planned econ-
omies; 
— the growing importance which the 
peripheral countries have acquired as ele-
ments for ensuring the stability and the growth 
of the international economy as a whole; 
— the strenghtening of the relations of 
interdependence among all the countries of the 
world in a scenario characterized by a growing 
process of trans nationalization. 
I should like to lay particular stress in this 
last-mentioned phenomenon. The fact that this 
increasing interdependence may be used 
—and in fact is— by the industrialized coun-
tries to disseminate images favourable to the 
promotion of their own interests should not 
lead us to ignore the fact that this is a real trend 
in the contemporary international system. It is 
a phenomenon which, although representing 
interdependence between non-equals, has 
given rise to new forms of relationships not 
only between the industrially advanced eco-
nomies but also between these and the peri-
pheral countries. 
If we limit ourselves to reviewing the latter 
group, we have to conclude that as a conse-
quence of these new realities, the forms of 
these relations have changed as well as the 
agents responsible for channelling them and 
the problems they involve. 
Firstly, the forms of centre-periphery rela-
tions have changed because we have pro-
gressed from the type of external linkage which 
prevailed in the 1950s —which was fundamen-
tally expressed in exports of primary goods, 
foreign investment in mining, and external 
aid— to a different system in which a growing 
number of developing countries, although 
continuing to be exporters of raw materials, 
have achieved a significant share in trade in 
manufactures, have become closely linked to 
the international financial markets, and are 
seeking new forms of relations with the trans-
national corporations and new means of ac-
quiring foreign technology. 
The agents of the process have also 
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changed. In the 1950s the main partners in the 
dialogue with the governments of the devel-
oping countries were the international finan-
cial bodies and foreign enterprises, mostly 
established in basic goods-producing activi-
ties. Today, many of these enterprises have 
been nationalized, and new partners in the 
dialogue have emerged connected with finan-
cial activities and the manufacturing sector. 
Lastly, the nature of the problems around 
which these relations revolve has changed, and 
the problems which traditionally affected 
centre-periphery relations are now accom-
panied —without detracting from their impor-
tance— by the problems of energy, protection-
ism and access to the markets of the industrial-
ized countries, industrial redeployment, the 
fluidity and predictability of the international 
financial markets, the capacity for the absorp-
tion and adaptation of foreign technology, and 
the improvement of contract terms with the 
transnational corporations. 
In other words, although the centre-pe-
riphery system continues to be valid, partic-
ularly as a category of analysis, it must today be 
appl ied to an international structure different 
from that of the past. This requires a reinter-
pretation of the relations between the two 
segments of the system, in the light of which 
the centres will probably present a less mono-
lithic image and some developing countries 
will occupy a less peripheral position. This 
phenomenon, which becomes clearer every 
day, was already anticipated by one of the best-
remembered of CEPAL's thinkers, José Medi-
na Echavarria, when, referring to an "obsessive 
topic ofrecentyears" , he raised "the possibility 
that some day the present system of depen-
dence may become antiquated owing to the fast 
or slow modification of its nature as unilateral 
hegemonic dependence" , or when he sug-
gested the emergence of "a new form of this 
dependence as a plurilateral relationship". 
We too observe that, under the impact of 
the transnationalization process, the unidirec-
tional form of external dependence to which 
w e were accustomed has changed and given 
way to the emergence of multiple power cir-
cuits which link developed and developing 
countries in different ways, depending on the 
interests or . agents operating in each. For 
example, there is the oil circuit and the circuit 
l inked with other mineral products of long-run 
crucial importance, as well as the food, tech-
nology and finance circuits. Each of these re-
volves around different interests, is operated by 
different agents, and involves different groups 
of countries with a likewise different relation of 
forces. All of this has helped to alter centre-
periphery relations, and we are today thus 
faced with a far more complex world whose 
new dynamics we must understand as a matter 
of urgency if we wish to strengthen our forms of 
international insertion. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE AND PRIORITY OF 
INDUSTRIALIZATION 
As we said earlier, the level of priority con-
ferred on the industrialization process has 
constituted another pillar of the CEPAL ap-
proach. Before directly examining its role and 
requirements in the scene before us, some 
general points should be briefly clarified. 
Of course, there can be no denying that 
what was formerly known as the 'industrial-
ization mystique' has weakened considerably. 
No doubt the deterioration of its image in 
the central economies, burdened by the prob-
lems brought on by industrialization, by the 
obsolescence facing some branches of produc-
tion, and by the challenges posed by the tran-
sition to a 'post-industrial' society has contri-
buted to this. 
However, a critical appreciation within the 
region itself has been added to this reflection of 
outside experience, with even greater impact. 
Currents of opposing signs and contrary con-
tent converge in this. 
For some, the adverse judgements on in-
dustrialization are due to the inadequacies or 
failures as regards the social transmission of its 
results and the creation of job opportunities, its 
lack of capacity to structure itself internally and 
establish firm links of complementarity with 
the other sectors, and the inability to ensure a 
development less dependent on different ex-
ternal influences. 
For others, however, the list of errors in-
cludes, inter alia, the high costs of production, 
the lack of competition and excessive protec-
tion, the disdain for comparative advantages, 
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the exaggerated and inefficient State interven-
tion and the failure to consider external trans-
actions. 
CEPAL brings to this discussion an at-
titude which is both critical'and positive and 
which, without ignoring —as is evident from 
the documentation— the relevance of many of 
these criticisms, subordinates them to the his-
torical significance and raison d'être of the 
industrialization process. All in all, we are 
convinced that if we can today speak of "a dif-
ferent Latin America" compared with that 
existing decades ago, this is basically due to the 
structural changes which have taken place, 
whose axis has been the unfolding of this 
process. 
1. An integral concept of industrialization 
As is well known, in the past CEPAL envisaged 
an industrialization process which went 
beyond the sectoral context and had the 'in-
dustrial society' as its horizon, i.e., a historical 
type of society —in its broadest sense— condi-
tioned by the dynamics of knowledge and the 
technical and scientific rationale applied pri-
mordially to industrial production, which oper-
ated as the primary driving force for its mod-
ernization-oriented growth and change. 
This dynamic role of industrialization im-
plies considerable alterations in the patterns of 
organization of the community and the State, in 
the forms of production and consumption, in 
the structuring of the social classes and estates, 
in political activity and institutionalization, in 
the international position of the countries' so-
cieties, and in the basic social personality of 
individuals. 
In brief —as was expressed in one of the 
most important documents on the subject pre-
pared by CEPAL,— it would not be appropriate 
to interpret the process from the limited stand-
point of the increase in the capacity of produc-
tion and the growing output of manufactures 
without placing it in the broader perspective of 
the social and cultural change with which it 
must necessarily be associated.5 
5
 CEPAL United Nations, The Process of Industrial 
Development in Latin America, 1966. 
') 2. Industrialization, technical progress and 
external trade 
The 1949 Economic Survey of Latin America 
maintained that in the former scheme of out-
ward-directed growth, technical progress was 
concentrated in the sectors aimed at producing 
low-cost foodstuffs and raw materials for the 
major industrial centres. However, it was 
argued, "as this progress spread, the surplus of 
the active population and the natural growth 
taking place in it were employed in industrial 
activities, transport and trade, as a logical 
consequence of the growth of the markets and 
the specialization and diversification of pro-
duction. Within this process, the improvement 
of agricultural and the evolution of industry 
were therefore two aspects of the same prob-
lem of economic development, and like the 
development of industry, transport and trade, 
the development of the services required per-
sons who were not needed in primary produc-
tion, which in turn could not grow without the 
correlative development of those other activi-
ties". For all these reasons, as another text of 
this period observed6 "industrialization is the 
growth form imposed by technical progress in 
the Latin American countries". 
The dynamic breadth and interlinking of 
the CEPAL approach and the fundamental ba-
sis of the phenomenon are thus made clear. 
Associated with the above view, a supple-
mentary argument emerges, introducing the re-
lation between the industrialization process 
and external relations, in which the circum-
stances which characterized world trade be-
tween the great depression and the start of the 
1960s are of undoubted importance. 
According to this point of view it is 
argued that the absolute or relative decline of 
the impulses from external trade —which had 
imposed and encouraged 'outward-directed 
growth'— should be offset by the mobilization 
of human and material resources for the supply 
and subsequent growth of the home market. 
This is, in short, the proposal known as 'in-
ward-directed growth'. 
6See Raúl Prebisch, Problemas teóricos y prácticos del 
crecimiento económico (1951). Series Commemorating the 
Twenty-fifth Anniversary of'CEPAL, 1973. 
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Although we shall come back to this later, 
it may be noted that this opinion, far from 
ignoring the role of external trade, recognized 
its strategic importance, although its priority 
and function were no longer the same as in the 
former system. 
Aside from the controversies on these re-
lations and the policies adopted in this respect 
by different countries, we firmly believe that 
these two main considerations continue to be 
valid although the specific situations in which 
they are stated are very different today and 
render necessary a creative reformulation of 
the means of tackling them. 
In the light of these ideas, and taking into 
account the changes which have occurred both 
in the region and in the rest of the world, what 
are the capital reasons which justify the central 
role of the industrialization process in what 
will probably constitute the scene in the 1980s ? 
3. Employment opportunities 
It should come as no surprise that we are 
opening this schematic analysis by looking at 
the problems and needs of the chief subject of 
our concern: the people of Latin America and 
particularly the large sector which has re-
mained completely or substantially marginated 
from the results of the development achieved. 
For the moment, let us bear in mind that 
during this decade the region's population will 
grow by slightly over 100 million persons, to 
around 455 million in 1990. More than 90% of 
the new inhabitants will be established in 
urban nuclei, while only 10 million will be 
added to the rural contingent. It is estimated 
that the employed population will increase by 
37 million persons, of whom 33 million will 
correspond to the urban centres.7 
From a strictly socio-economic point of 
view these figures raise further unavoidable 
questions: how are their vital needs to be met? 
Where will they find jobs which will enable 
them to produce and have access to the goods 
and services which are lacking? 
In order to approach this subject it should 
be recalled that towards the end of the last 
7
 See CELADE, Boletín demográfico, Vol. XII, No. 23, 
Santiago, Chile, January 1979. 
decade (1977) it was calculated that approxi-
mately one-third of all Latin Americans were to 
be found below the 'poverty line' and a slightly 
larger percentage was unemployed or em-
ployed in exceedingly low-productivity and 
low-income activities. We should point out, 
however, that these figures recorded some 
modest progress compared with the situation at 
the beginning of the decade, although the ab-
solute volumes of those affected had not 
changed.8 
If we concentrate from the start on the de-
cisive question of employment, the research. 
carried out by PRE ALC provides a panorama of 
developments in the last three decades (see 
table 6). 
Broadly defined, the industrial sphere 
(including manufacturing, construction, elec-
tricity and transport) employed about 22% of 
the economically active population in 1950 and 
27% in 1980. This involved annual growth rates 
of 2.7% between 1950 and 1970 and 3.8% be-
tween 1970 and 1980. Adding to this the in-
direct effects on other activities, industrial-
ization affected 35% of the labour force in 1950 
and 47% in 1980.9 In other words, nearly half of 
regional employment at the end of last decade 
was connected with this global process. 
These figures are in significant contrast to 
the rather pessimistic evaluation which has 
prevailed in this regard, which seems to have 
been dominated by several main factors. 
One is the isolated appraisal of the indus-
trial sector in the strict sense, although even so 
it increased its share in total employment from 
14% to 16% between 1950 and 1980, raised its 
annual rate of absorption of the labour force 
from 2.2% between 1950 and 1970 to 3.8% be-
tween 1970 and 1980, and in the latter decade 
offered employment to over 21% of the in-
crease in the economically active population. 
This picture is notably altered if the more 
general and dynamic projection of the process 
is considered, as we did earlier. However, 
there is no doubt that the primordial element in 
the underestimation stems from the fact that it 
8CEPAL/UNDP, ¿Se puede superar la pobreza? 
(E/CEPAL/G.1139), Santiago, Chile, 1980. 
9Only the backward linkages are considered, so as to 
avoid duplication in the calculations. 
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Source: Preliminary estimates by PREALC on the basis of national population censuses (adjusted) and surveys (adjusted). 
Note: The total includes information from 14 countries which account for around 95% of the economically active 
population of Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
aIn Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela the data correspond to 1960, since no information is available for 1950. 
passes over the capital impact of the growth 
rates of population, the labour force and the 
rapid migration towards the urban and metro-
politan centres. Each of these elements repre-
sents a 'divisor7 which notably cuts down the 
extent and particularly the social appreciation 
of the progress registered. 
Although it is a well-known fact that the 
evolution of Latin America (except for a very 
few countries) has been exceptional in all these 
aspects, they have not always been duly related 
to the criticisms or dissatisfaction regarding the 
availability of productive employment or the 
persistence of urban marginality.
 N 
It is therefore useful to consider some 
primordial facts in this regard. 
Firstly, as was observed in a recent 
document, between 1950 and 1975 the popula-
tion of Latin America grew more rapidly than 
that of any other region in the world. In these 25 
years it doubled, while the world population 
increased by slightly under 60% and that of the 
developed countries by only just over 30%. In 
addition, the annual rate of growth of the urban 
population (in cities of more than 20 000 
inhabitants) was more than 5%, pushing up its 
quota in the total population from 26% to 45% 
in that period.10 
The contrast of circumstances can be 
appreciated with greater clarity if the evolution 
of Latin America is compared with that of the 
countries of the European Economic Commu-
nity (EEC) as regards some key variables of the 
problem in the 1960s, which was a decade of 
great dynamism and labour immigration in the 
latter area. As may be seen from table 7, indus-
trial employment in the EEÒ grew by only 
0.5% annually, but even so this rate con-
siderably exceeded the growth of the labour 
force and may be compared with the rate of 
increase of the population: 1.2%. In Latin 
America, however, while employment in in-
dustry grew annually by 3.5%, it was accom-
panied by an increase of 3.1% in the population 
and 2.9% in the labour force.11 
,0CEPAL, Latin America on the threshold of the 
1980s, op. cit. 
Hit should be noted that the period 1960-1970 is not 
specifically considered in table 6 and that the methodology 
and data used by the two sources (PREALC and ILO) may 
differ to some extent. At all events, however, the dif-
ferences are obvious enough to illustrate the situations 
compared. 
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Table 7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: ANNUAL GROWTH 
RATES OF POPULATION AND EMPLOYMENT (1960-1970) 
Population Labour force Industrial employment 
Latin America 3.1 2.9 3.5 
EEC 1.2 0.2 0.5 
Source: ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics. 
These facts, of primordial interest for the 
matter under consideration, will continue to be 
of importance in the next few decades —as we 
have already indicated— despite the small 
declines anticipated in population and urban 
growth rates. This aspect should be stressed in 
order to put the exaggerated or interested 
expectations which sometimes figure in popu-
lation control policies in their proper place, 
al though this does not mean denying their 
great importance and the need for them as long-
term guidelines. It should be noted in this 
regard that this aim is considered today a great 
deal more objectively than in the past, when 
contrary prejudices prevailed. 
In any case, the above permits it to be con-
fidently reaffirmed that the industrialization 
process will continue to be decisive for the 
creation of job opportunities for the population 
of Latin America. 
4. The industrialization process 
and social development 
No less solid, in our opinion, is the argument 
which associates this phenomenon with the 
priority that should be given to social develop-
ment , the satisfaction of the community's vital 
needs and the eradication of poverty. 
In this regard, the concern of governments 
and of the circles which represent the region's 
opinion has been included and analysed in 
United Nations studies which have made pos-
sible considerable clarification of the nature 
of this problem and the existing options for 
efficiently tackling it within a reasonable 
period of time.12 
This is not the place for repeating the main 
lines of the diagnoses and policies put forward. 
We shall therefore limit ourselves to certain 
aspects which have a more direct impact on the 
question under consideration. 
In this regard we have maintained for some 
t ime that this is a perfectly possible mission, 
supported by the progress made in the size and 
structure of production in the region, although 
obviously there are notorious differences be-
tween the situation in the various countries or 
in specific sectors or groups. At the global level, 
and from the standpoint of the necessary trans-
fers and reallocation of incomes, for example, 
elimination of the basic inadequacies in nutri-
tion, health, education and housing would call 
for the allocation of between 3.5 and 5.5% of the 
gross regional product to this objective.13 
It is, however, obvious that even this min-
imal and apparently feasible requirement in-
volves difficult and conflictive political, insti-
tutional and also strictly economic readjust-
ments . 
Outstanding among the last-mentioned 
—which we are now stressing— are the 
changes in the levels and structure of the 
system of production which this top-priority 
objective requires. In brief, not only is a satis-
factory growth rate required, but also that this 
growth should give rise to a preferential in-
crease in goods and services for basic consump-
tion, while at the same time investments should 
acquire an adequate size and structure to serve 
this aim and to absorb the available labour. 
These readjustments must obviously take 
account of the differences existing among the 
countries of the region, on account of their size, 
1 2See in particular CEPAL/UNDP, ¿Se puede superar 
ta pobreza?, op. cit. Mlbid. 
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the dimensions of their markets, the resources 
they possess or their potential for finding a 
place in international markets. 
In any case, this 'real' counterpart of the 
endeavour to alter income distribution directly 
or indirectly is a cardinal element for this strat-
egy. It is a well-known fact that the failure to 
consider these two dimensions has been one of 
the outstanding causes of the frustration (and 
accompanying outbreaks of inflation) of the 
merely redistributive or populist policies. 
The memory of these phenomena should 
warn us against the temptation to seek to make 
the changes which would have to be intro-
duced into the 'real' structures of production of 
our countries through policies which, from one 
standpoint or another, upset the delicate bal-
ance or counterpoint which should exist be-
tween planning and the market. We also ought 
to be on our guard against attempts to seek 
these changes through excessive protection-
ism. It is also necessary to take into account 
the case of countries which, because of their 
dimensions or economic structures, are obliged 
to pursue external strategies aimed at obtaining 
through international trade part of the 
consumer goods required to meet the essential 
needs of their societies. Lastly, I must not 
forget to refer to the very important role 
devolving on the agricultural sector in meeting 
these needs: a topic to which I shall refer in 
the third part of this report. 
5. Industry as the axis of technological 
progress 
The priority position of the industrialization 
process also stands out in sharp relief if con-
sideration is given to its role as the main in-
strument of technological progress. The im-
portance of this facet of the problem —fre-
quently underestimated— requires more care-
ful consideration. 
This reveals one of the substantive roles 
which the sector plays: that of the basic pro-
vider of technical knowledge and, at advanced 
stages, a demanding consumer of this same 
knowledge. The degree of interaction between 
the scientific and technical structure and 
industrial production in fact constitutes a 
revealing measure of the degree of economic 
development. 
These considerations of a general nature 
give rise to other more specific considerations 
when the situation of the region is examined. 
There are analyses which reveal the existence 
of definite asymmetry in the structure of Latin 
American industry, particularly in the inade-
quate development of production equipment. 
Although this structure varies in the different 
countries, the observation is to some extent 
valid for all, and doubtless for the region as a 
whole. 
The description we have applied to indus-
trial activity as the bringer of knowledge 
applies particularly to the manufacture of pro-
duction goods. There are numerous reasons for 
this, but here only two are stressed: firstly, that 
the manufacture of production equipment 
requires a more complete mastery of the pro-
cess to which it is applied than that required for 
its use; and secondly, that the requirements of 
quality, accuracy and reliability in capital goods 
are, generally speaking, greater than those with 
which consumer products must comply. 
Being a producer of equipment or not 
would thus constitute, although not of course 
the only one, at least a substantive indicator of 
the degree of industrial development reached. 
This indicator includes considerations of a 
qualitative nature which do not appear in 
the mere appreciation of the volume of 
manufacturing output. 
Naturally, when the Latin American situa-
tion is reviewed on a country-by-country basis, 
we find very different situations. The countries 
with the largest markets have achieved their 
own capital goods industries, which are able to 
cover large percentages of national require-
ments in many sectors; however, the medium-
sized and small countries generally only en-
gage in incipient activities in this field. This 
difference between the two groups, together 
with the nature of the production of equipment 
as an instrument of technological stimulus, 
calls for some reference, even if only in pass-
ing, to the case of the countries with the 
smallest markets. Should they renounce all 
pretensions to the manufacture of their own 
working tools? We do not think so and see at 
least three possibilities: 
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(a) Joint action, through formal integration 
agreements , to establish a market of a sufficient 
size. Thorough studies and serious political 
efforts have been made in this regard. Its feasi-
bility has, however, been called in question, 
not only in regional but also in subregional 
terms, at least in the short term. But this alone 
does not refute the fact that integration 
continues to be a substantive instrument for 
the development of countries with limited 
markets. 
(b) A careful use of their own markets, 
even if limited, in order to bring technological 
progress to the metal manufactures and ma-
chinery industry. It must be borne in mind that 
producer goods are of different degrees of 
complexity; for example, the pipes or the sluice-
gates of a hydroelectric power station may be 
manufactured by factories existing in the ma-
jority of the medium-sized and small countries 
with minor additional investment, provided 
that the project has taken this possibility into 
account. The implementation of this effort may 
train the enterprise in question for tackling 
other manufactures which possibly have great-
er requirements and permit it to raise the qual-
ity of its normal output. 
(c) The supply and maintenance of the 
equ ipment required for primary production 
opens up a third field of activities which, apart 
from dealing with local demand, may lead to 
specialization which could be projected into 
international trade. 
6. The false dilemma between openness to the 
exterior and industrialization 
Lastly, we should stress the crucial relations 
be tween the process of industrialization and 
the ways of giving the Latin American econ-
omies a place in the international context. We 
can thus link this analysis with the earlier out-
l ine of the centre-periphery problem. 
In this regard—let us be frank—a formerly 
dominant criterion has reappeared with regard 
to a hypothetical alternative between one type 
of growth based on the mobilization of re-
sources for export and another which stresses 
its orientation towards satisfying the domestic 
market. This would therefore be a choice be-
tween 'outward-directed' growth and 'inward-
directed' development, or between import 
substitution and export production. 
This is not the moment to review the 
theory and the circumstances which have 
inspired this proposition, but we shall 
emphatically stress that CEPAL's thinking and 
its normative derivations have invariably 
rejected this false dilemma and on the contrary 
have supported the indispensable complemen-
tarity of trade with the exterior and the use of 
resources for supplying national markets. 
This fusion of objectives is essential, in 
our opinion, on account of two considerations 
which we shall describe briefly. 
One is that the historical and structural 
conformation of Latin America, registered in its 
present and prospective coefficients of open-
ness to the exterior, determines that its devel-
opment will depend primordially on the utili-
zation of the majority of its human and material 
resources in activities directed at the home 
market. 
As is obvious, this general premise is con-
ditioned by the individual realities of each 
economy, and the relative importance of the 
'outward-directed' or 'inward-directed' desti-
nation of the output generated varies according 
to these. Without omitting other factors of 
importance, the significance of external trade 
in the smaller and medium-sized countries has 
been and will be greater than in the countries 
with huge present or potential home markets; 
and conversely, in the latter the role of the 
domestic market clearly predominates.14 
On the other hand, a growing and sustain-
ed relationship with the exterior is vital for 
maintaining this 'inward-directed' develop-
ment and for satisfying other essential require-
ments of global growth. We may briefly recall 
the following top-priority aspects: 
(a) The provision of the imported supple-
mentary supplies which it is materially impos-
s i b l e to produce locally or whose production 
comes up against manifest obstacles (definitive 
14
 While the percentage of exports in the GDP achieved 
in 1980 amounted to nearly 8% in the three largest coun-
tries, that of groups of medium-sized and small economies 
reached 15% and 24% respectively. See CEFAL, Economic 
Survey of Latin America, 1978 (United Nations Publica-
tion, Sales No. E. 80.II.G. 1), Part Three. 
DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY / Enrique V. falésias 29 
or temporary) arising out of the size of the na-
tional markets, the resources available, tech-
nological requirements and other well-known 
factors; 
(b) The existence of primary or manufac-
tur ing activities basically intended for the 
foreign market which must also furnish the 
bulk of the foreign currency to finance the 
country's imports; 
(c) The additional fact that there are activ-
ities —mainly industrial— which can only be 
carried out efficiently if domestic demand is 
supplemented with external demand in order 
to reach adequate levels of productivity and 
costs, apart from also supplementing supplies 
of foreign exchange. 
Viewing this question from the standpoint 
of the earlier review of the centre-periphery 
system and the nature and options regarding 
the international position of the Latin Ameri-
can economies, the capital significance of the 
process of diversification of production, 
the axis of which is the industrial complex, is 
even more obvious. 
Thus , to stress only the primordial aspect 
of our thesis, it seems illusory to imagine a new 
pattern of external relations —more dynamic, 
stable and advantageous for national develop-
ment— without this process of internal changes 
which is projected towards the exterior and is 
based on the incentives and supplies resulting 
from trade with other economies. 
This position is empirically supported by 
the indisputable fact that the vigorous deploy-
men t of world trade in the postwar period was 
mainly due to the transactions in industrial 
goods, a phenomenon which will continue to 
be of importance in the future according to the 
most authorized forecasts. 
In short, therefore, the termination or at-
tenuation of the centre-periphery dichotomy is 
inconceivable without the internal changes 
which accompany the global phenomenon of 
industrialization, and without this assisting in 
achieving and benefitting from a new form of 
insertion in the world economy. 
7. The lessons of experience 
This real situation and the prospect of the new 
circumstances, potentials and restrictions 
make a creative reformulation of the strategy of 
the industrialization process and its national 
variations a necessity. For this reason we must 
scrutinize their past, and keep a lookout for 
their future. 
I t would be vain to attempt this urgent and 
difficult task here. We can, however, sum up 
some requirements which will most certainly 
have to be taken into account in outlining that 
strategy, and which are closely interrelated. 
They are also in keeping with the central objec-
tives of the style of development which has 
been proposed in the organization's confer-
ences, i.e., one which will ensure the dynamic 
and regular growth of our economies, greater 
fairness in the social distribution of their 
benefits, and a satisfactory level of autonomy 
vis-à-vis outside influences. 
T h e following would be the requisites 
which we consider to be of top priority for a 
new cycle of Latin American industrialization: 
(a) To ensure the progress and greater 
selectivity of this process, in contrast with the 
extensive or indiscriminate spread of earlier 
efforts. A more in-depth approach to this pro-
cess implies the search for greater complemen-
tarity of the industrial spectrum itself and of 
industry with the other sectors of production; 
(b) To intensify and rationalize the absorp-
tion, adjustment and creation of technological 
progress, giving preference to the activities 
—such as the manufacture of machinery and 
equipment— which constitute their centres of 
learning and diffusion, and to the scientific 
base of research and development which gen-
erates or assimilates it; 
(c) To increase substantially the priority 
assigned to the branches intended to satisfy the 
essential needs of the population and thus take 
account of all the elements which may help to 
raise the level of employment and productivity 
and the income of the labour force; 
(d) to make a prior and realistic evaluation 
of the crucial links between the industrializa-
tion process and the external sector, admitting 
that the neglect of this in the past constituted 
the most vulnerable aspect of its continuity and 
solidity. We must therefore repeat that the 
dynamics of growth and of industrialization 
itself require a sustained increase in foreign 
trade and that this trade in turn will depend to a 
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decisive extent on the contribution of this 
process; 
(e) To take explicitly into account in the 
general policy and in the specific initiatives 
their decisive effect on the environment, urban 
or metropolitan concentration and spatial dis-
equilibria. This concern, obviously neglected 
in the past, has acquired singular importance in 
the present circumstances. 
(f) To clarify the guiding norms as regards 
the ever-controversial question of protection-
ism or the liberalization of external transac-
tions. The excessive distortions introduced by 
the use of protectionism long after the events 
which prompted it in the past have been thor-
oughly diagnosed. But it is no less obvious that 
the experiences of radical liberalization also 
clearly reveal the disadvantages they bring 
with them. It is therefore necessary to obviate 
these fluctuations and define both the general 
criteria and the criteria for specific situations. 
They should combine the indispensable safe-
guards for the national economies —justified 
by the structure and level of their develop-
ment— with measures aimed at making *he 
most of the benefits and stimuli of a differ». \t 
and carefully studied international division of 
labour. 
Lastly, let us reiterate our long-standing 
conviction that progress in this process cannot 
be subordinated—as is sometimes suggested— 
to another mistaken alternative: that which 
contrasts the outright pre-eminence of market 
mechanisms, on the one hand, with the over-
whelming omnipresence of the State or of 
publ ic control on the other. 
It is not possible to dwell here on this con-
troversial and topical debate. We shall merely 
reproduce the essence of what was maintained 
long ago (in 1961) in that connexion and still 
remains applicable: 
"...reference has been made to the need for 
conscious and deliberate action to influence 
the market forces [in other words, in today's 
terms, to influence the market] and orient them 
towards attaining certain economic and social 
goals... However, care should be taken not to 
draw erroneous conclusions from that argu-
ment . The aim is not to suppress the forces in 
question —which have enormous growth po-
tential— but to establish through State action 
the conditions that are essential for ensuring 
that such potential can be exploited in the in-
terests of economic development."15 
The specific results of this enunciation of 
principles —which goes beyond and incorpo-
rates the terms of that misleading dilemma— is 
to be found, as is well known, in our perse-
vering sponsorship of effective planning 
methods capable of dealing in a rational man-
ner with the various problems outlined earlier. 
Despite all the vicissitudes and the con-
straints affecting Latin American efforts in that 
connexion, it could hardly be denied that con-
siderable progress has been made in this way, 
both in the institutional sphere and in that of 
specific achievements and with regard to the 
establishment of an extensive and competent 
corps of technical experts. 
We do not claim that these views are new. 
In fact, they stem from concerns that have 
always been present in CEPAL's analyses, as 
can be readily demonstrated. However, it 
would seem that the time has come to expand 
on these ideas and to revise them in the light of 
the changing scenarios and prospects we have 
before us. 
At the same time, we believe that the 
weight of circumstances and the tasks we have 
ahead of us have overtaken purely academic or 
ideological debate on the matter. It will there-
fore suffice to bear in mind, as an outstanding 
example, the reality of the energy challenge 
and of policies for dealing with that challenge 
—to which I shall return at a later point. 
Everywhere these realities are making it nec-
essary to adopt an express definition of appro-
priate ways and means for the short, medium 
and long term —in other words, to engage in 
planning. In this process the guiding and exec-
utive presence of the State, in conjunction with 
the market forces and private, national and 
foreign enterprise, is of great importance. 
1 5CEPAL, Desarrollo económico, planeamiento y coo-
peración internacional, Series Commemorating the 
Twenty-firth Anniversary of CEPAL, Santiago, Chite, 
1973. 
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III 
Strategic problems of the new decade 
Basically, the changes that are taking place in 
the world economy have been generated by the 
t rends recorded in the developed economies 
and by the policies adopted by the OPEC coun-
tries. Thei r impact on the majority of the coun-
tries of the periphery has been particularly 
strong and immediate, owing to the fact that the 
international economy has become more inter-
dependen t ; in other words, the trends gener-
ated in the more dynamic segments of the 
system contain mechanisms that act as power-
ful pulleys transmitting the phenomena in 
question to the rest of the system. 
Among these transmission mechanisms are: 
inflation in the central countries, which 
spreads to the periphery through the increase 
in the prices of capital goods and manufactures, 
thus reinforcing the inflationary factors already 
operat ing there; the recession in the industrial-
ized countries and the resulting reduction in 
their imports, which are factors that have help-
ed to weaken the trend towards the expansion 
of international trade recorded prior to 1974, 
which had become a powerful motor for growth 
for the developing countries; protectionism, 
with which the industrialized countries re-
spond when confronted with the recessive 
trends in question, in order to defend not only 
their agricultural production but also a growing 
n u m b e r of industrial branches, thus limiting 
the exports by countries on the periphery; the 
increase in the price of oil, consumption of 
which the countries of the periphery cannot 
reduce or substitute in the short term without 
threatening their economic growth rates, 
owing precisely to the stages that their devel-
opment processes have reached; and, lastly, 
adoption by the periphery of development 
styles which are fashioned after those of the 
industrialized centres and which reinforce 
energy requirements and other inflexible fac-
tors that affect their economic and social 
processes. 
Within this context, I should like to place 
particular emphasis on four areas of concern for 
the countries of the periphery at the beginning 
of this new decade, namely, international 
trade, international financing, the energy tran-
sition, and security with regard to food sup-
plies. 
1, International trade 
With regard to the first of these areas, it should 
be reiterated that maintenance of, or an in-
crease in, the rate of expansion of the exports of 
the countries of the periphery is a basic re-
quirement for enabling those countries to 
attain a satisfactory rate of growth. In the case of 
Latin America, which maintained a relatively 
high rate of expansion of its trade in the midst of 
a highly recessive international situation, this 
is not a Utopian proposition. Of course, the 
dynamism of the external sector depends, on 
the one hand, on generation of an ever greater 
and more diversified flow of exportable prod-
ucts and, on the other hand, on the possibility of 
having increasing access to international mar-
kets. The first of these requirements is linked to 
the strengthening and expansion of the produc-
tion structure of the Latin American countries 
and, more particularly, to the industrialization 
process: elements to which I have already re-
ferred. With regard to access to international 
markets, this depends basically on the rate of 
expansion of world trade and the degree of suc-
cess achieved in the struggle against protec-
tionism, which has made a forceful reappear-
ance in the industrialized countries in recent 
years. 
Unfortunately, the prospects that can be 
glimpsed on these two fronts at the beginning 
of the 1980s are not at all promising. It is esti-
mated that in the three-year period 1980-1982 
growth in world trade will be little over 4% per 
annum, compared with a rate of just under 6% 
during the 1970s and one of approximately 8% 
in the 1960s. 
The Secretariat has been clear and consis-
tent in its efforts to denounce the enormous 
damage that the protectionism of the centres is 
causing, not only by slowing the growth of the 
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countries of the periphery, but also, and espe-
cially, by deferring the adjustment and the re-
covery of the international economy as a whole 
—with respect to which the growth of the coun-
tries of the periphery revealed itself to be a 
dynamic factor of the greatest importance 
dur ing the prolonged period of recession that 
started at the beginning of the past decade. The 
Secretariat has also consistently stressed the 
more systematic, insidious and selective nature 
that the protectionist phenomenon has taken 
on as —in addition to tariff measures that dis-
criminate against the periphery's exportable 
products a set of non-tariff measures, such as 
quotas, countervailing duties, 'voluntary' res-
trictions and so-called market organization 
agreements have been adopted, with the same 
aim of restricting our countries' exports and 
with even more effective results. 
It would, however, be wrong to misinter-
pre t the long-term importance of the resur-
gence of protectionism in the centres. Until 
only 15 years or so ago the periphery's concerns 
were focused on its so-called inability to par-
ticipate to any significant extent in trade in 
manufactures —which was the dynamic ele-
ment in international trade—and its bargaining 
power was concentrated on obtaining preferen-
tial treatment that would enable it to gain ac-
cess for such goods to the markets of the indus-
trialized countries. The reappearance of pro-
tectionism in the latter countries is partly a 
reaction to the considerable increase in the 
competit iveness of a growing number of devel-
oping countries in the lines of business in 
question, and partly a manifestation of the 
crisis through which the industrialized coun-
tries are passing. By continuing with protec-
tionism, these countries are only restricting the 
role that the developing countries could play as 
a dynamic element of the international system, 
and they are, at the same time, deferring the 
adaptation and modernization of their own 
economies. 
Finally, I could not omit a reference to the 
new circumstances that tend to reinforce one of 
the theses and proposals most identified with 
C E P A L thinking; those which stress the impor-
tance of regional integration. 
Despite its vicissitudes, this objective has 
lost none of its fundamental raison d'être: on 
the contrary, it seems to have been reinforced. 
As a recent report of the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank maintains, in the emerging inter-
national context "the importance of the integra-
tion process for developing countries must be 
emphasized, not only because it would stimu-
late their economies by means of reciprocal 
trade, but also because it would lead them to 
operate on a larger scale and would improve 
their economic efficiency". 
Evaluating the probable adverse repercus-
sions of the stagnation of the central economies 
on world trade and the growth of the periphery, 
Professor A. Lewis "(in the address he gave on 
receiving the Nobel Prize in Economics) stres-
sed the tremendous importance of this path 
today. After observing that the developing 
countries possess an important instrument for 
tackling this problem by boosting trade among 
them, he stressed the opportunities which have 
lately opened up in this regard, and the formal 
and informal means of causing them to mate-
rialize. One of his basic opinions merits 
thought: "If a suficcient number of LDCs reach 
self-sustaining growth, we are into a new 
world. For this will mean that instead of trade 
determining the rate of growth of LDC produc-
tion, it will be the growth of LDC production 
that determines LDC trade, and it will be in-
ternal forces that will determine the rate of 
growth of their production". 
2. External financing 
Two basic facts have characterized Latin Ame-
rica's process of external indebtedness during 
the past decade. The first was its extremely 
rapid growth; the second, the radical change in 
the sources of external credit. These changes 
have had both positive and negative effects on 
the region's development. However, before 
considering the advantages and drawbacks of 
such changes, it would be appropriate to recall 
the basic dimensions of this simultaneous pro-
cess of quantitative expansion of, and qualita-
tive change in, the external debt. 
(a) The expansion of the external debt 
In 1970 the public and officially guaran-
teed medium and long-term external debt of 
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Latin America was US$ 16 billion. Ten years 
later it had increased almost eightfold and was 
estimated to be approximately US$ 125 billion. 
However, despite its extraordinary size this 
rise does not fully reflect the increase in Latin 
America's overall indebtedness abroad. In 
view of the fact that, particularly in the second 
half of the past decade, the forms of external 
credit that expanded the most rapidly were 
loans granted without official guarantees by 
private international banks, the region's total 
external debt is currently much higher than the 
officially guaranteed debt. In fact, at the end of 
1980 it was estimated that the former amounted 
to approximately TJS$ 195 billion. In other 
words, between 1974 —the first year for which 
there is reliable information on non-guaran-
teed bank credits— and 1980, Latin America's 
total gross external debt increased more than 
threefold, whilst in net terms it rose fourfold 
(see table 8). 
Naturally, this exceptional rise in the nom-
inal level of indebtedness partly reflected the 
effects of world inflation. That increase should, 
moreover, also be considered in the light of the 
relatively rapid growth in the region's total 
product and the considerable increase in the 
value of its exports ofgoods and services which 
occurred at the same time. 
However, even if these factors are taken 
into account, the increase in debt during the 
past decade was considerable. Thus, for exam-
ple, if both the officially guaranteed external 
debt and the national product are considered in 
real terms, it may be seen that, after rising from 
11% in 1960 to almost 14% in 1970, the ratio 
between the two rose to almost 28% in 1978. 
The ratio between the servicing of officially 
guaranteed external debt and the total value of 
exports ofgoods and services followed a similar 
trend. Thus, between the early 1960s and the 
mid-1970s, amortization and interest payments 
consistently absorbed approximately 13.5% of 
the value of exports; however, subsequently 
that ratio rose sharply, and in 1978 debt ser-
vicing already amounted to 26% of the total 
value of the goods and services exported. 
Whatever the indicator used, then, the 
conclusion that emerges is the same: during the 
past decade, and particularly in its second half, 
the Latin American external debt grew at an 
exceptionally high and steady rate. 
(b) Changes in the sources of 
external financing 
As already noted, this unprecedent expan-
sion of the external debt was accompanied by 
Table 8 
LATIN AMERICA: OVERALL EXTERNAL DEBT11 
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^Preliminary estimates subject to revision. 
including debt with IMF. 
"'Exeludinggold. 
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considerable changes in its sources and modal-
ities. Basically, the changes in question were 
due to the extraordinarily rapid increase in pri-
vate loans in the past decade, whose growth 
rate far exceeded that of official credits. Thus, 
whereas during the period 1960-1970 loans 
from private sources accounted for an average 
of only one-third of Latin American external 
financing, in 1979 they accounted for three-
quarters of such financing. 
In turn, the chief cause of this sharp rise in 
the relative share of financing from private 
sources was the abrupt expansion of loans 
granted by the international commercial banks, 
whose importance early in the 1970s, in con-
trast, was extremely limited. During the five-
year period 1966-1970 net financing from such 
institutions barely amounted to US$ 300 mil-
lion annually, an amount equivalent to only 
one-third of the value of loans granted by of-
ficial bodies and less than half of the value of 
direct foreign investment during those years. 
In 1979, however, the relative share of these 
three components of external financing had 
changed dramatically. In that year credits pro-
vided by the international commercial banks 
rose to US$ 17 billion, that is to say, they were 
six times larger than both the amount of fi-
nancing from official sources and that from 
direct investment (see table 9). 
(c) Oil surpluses, recycling and indebtedness 
Naturally, changes as far-reaching as those 
that have occurred over the past ten years in the 
amount, composition and terms of Latin Ame-
rica's external debt are not to be explained only 
by factors relating to the region's internal de-
velopment, but must also be considered in the 
light of the profound transformations that have 
T a b l e 9 
N O N - O I L - E X P O R T I N G L A T I N A M E R I C A N C O U N T R I E S " 
E X T E R N A L F I N A N C I N G 
(Billions of dollars) 
I. Use made of external 
financing (1+2) 
1. Current account dericitb 
2. Changes in reserves 
[I. External financing (3+4+5) 
3. Direct investment 
4. Donations 
5. Nets loans0 
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Source: International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments Yearbook; World Bank, WorldDebt Tables, November 1980; 
Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report, June 1979 and Supplements, and CEPAL estimates. 
' i n c lud ing Mexico and Peru. 
Excluding official donations. 
i n c l u d i n g long, medium and short-term compensatory and non-compensatory loans. 
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taken place at the same time on the interna-
tional economic scene. 
When looking at the situation from this 
point of view, it is necessary first of all to recall 
two well-known but fundamental facts. The 
first of these is that the rapid and massive in-
crease that took place in Latin America's exter-
nal debt during the past decade was both a 
cause and a consequence of the high current 
account deficits recorded simultaneously in 
the region's balance of payments. 
The second fact is that these negative bal-
ances —which reached a total of US$ 122 bil-
lion in the period 1970-1980—were particular-
ly from 1974 onwards, the counterpart of a pro-
portion of the financial surpluses accumulated 
dur ing that period by a number of the chief 
petroleum-exporting countries. Since these 
countries, on the one hand, had at their disposal 
abundan t financial resources from their sales of 
hydrocarbons and, on the other hand, were not 
in a position to use these resources entirely 
within their own countries, owing both to struc-
tural factors and to circumstances relating to 
current economic conditions, they deposited a 
high proportion of their surpluses with private 
international banks and financial institutions. 
In turn, these banks and institutions found that 
their opportunities to expand their credits sig-
nificantly in the industrialized countries were 
restricted, initially owing to the recession that 
those countries entered in the middle of the 
1970s and subsequently owing to their slow 
and uneven recovery. 
In these circumstances it was naturally at-
tractive for the international commercial banks 
to channel a high proportion of their new and 
much more abundant financial resources to the 
relatively more advanced economies of the 
Third World, among them a good number of 
Latin American economies. 
In turn, the presence of this ready supply 
of funds from the international commercial 
banks coincided with the need for most Latin 
American economies rapidly to secure a greater 
volume of external resources in order to be able 
to mee t the increased cost of their imports 
caused by the considerable rises in the inter-
national price of petroleum and by the acceler-
ation of inflation in the industrialized 
countries. 
Thus, the chief —although certainly not 
the only— cause of the exceptional growth of, 
and the market change in the composition of, 
Latin America's overall external debt was the 
unusual set of circumstances prevailing on the 
world economic scene throughout the past 
decade, and particularly following the first 
major rise in the international price of hydro-
carbons. On the one hand, these circumstances 
multiplied many times the financial surpluses 
of the petroleum-exporting countries, and on 
the other hand they also considerably in-
creased the requirements for external resour-
ces of the majority of the Latin American econ-
omies. These circumstances also increased the 
funds at the disposal of the international com-
mercial banks, which could thus play the role of 
financial intermediary that was indispensable 
for transferring the surpluses accumulated by 
the petroleum economies to countries whose 
current account deficits had risen sharply as a 
result of the impact of the deterioration in their 
terms of trade and the stagflation prevailing in 
the industrialized countries. 
(d) Advantages and limitations of the 
new external indebtedness 
As pointed out at the beginning, the con-
siderable increase in Latin America's external 
deb t over the past ten years brought both bene-
fits and constraints for Latin American devel-
opment . 
Among the benefits, it is necessary to 
stress, firstly, the obvious fact that it was 
basically with the aid of the new, large-scale 
credits that the region could finance its high 
balance-of-payments current account deficits 
dur ing the period in question. To put it another 
way, higher indebtedness was the chief mech-
anism for effecting the transfer of external 
savings called for, by definition, by any current 
account deficit. 
T h e ready availability of credit from the 
private international banks was of particularly 
decisive importance in the petroleum-im-
porting Latin American countries. In fact, when 
they were faced with a sharp increase in the 
cost of their imports owing to the rise in the 
international price of hydrocarbons and the 
acceleration of inflationary processes in the 
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industrialized countries, many such Latin 
American countries managed, by taking out 
new loans, to carry out more gradually the 
inevitable and difficult adjustment called for 
by the sharp deterioration in their terms of 
trade. 
Moreover, it must also be recognized that, 
at least until the middle of the past decade, the 
actual cost of the new debt was lower, since the 
nominal rates of interest charged did not 
adequately anticipate the increase in the rate of 
international inflation. 
Lastly, attention should be drawn to two 
favourable characteristics that were general 
features of financing from private sources. 
T h e first such characteristic was the rapidi-
ty with which the financing in question could 
be obtained; a particularly important feature in 
view of the pressing requirements resulting 
from the sharp changes that occurred in the 
world economy, and in marked contrast to the 
long periods of time that were often required in 
order to obtain approval and payment of loans 
granted by official financing bodies. 
The second advantage of financing 
through private banks was its flexibility. 
Unlike credits granted by suppliers or by a 
number of governmental financing agencies, 
loans provided by the international com-
mercial banks had 'no strings attached' and did 
not set restrictions with regard to the markets 
where they might be used. This flexibility was 
also apparent in the fact that such banks 
exercised virtually no control over the manner 
and sectors in which the borrowers spent the 
funds obtained. In particular —barring excep-
tional cases— governments (which were often 
the recipients of such loans) could conduct their 
economic policy independently, without 
having to submit decisive aspects of such 
policy for prior approval of periodic monitoring 
by the bodies supplying the funds. 
However, the steady growth in external 
debt and the increasingly larger share of such 
deb t accounted for by credits from internation-
al commercial banks also entailed elements 
that were unfavourable to the region's devel-
opment . 
Thus , such financing was obtained at in-
terest rates considerably higher than those 
charged by official bilateral or multilateral 
credit agencies, and this ultimately raised the 
real cost of the debt. This cost also rose as the 
practice of setting a variable interest rate that 
was adjusted twice-yearly to take into account 
fluctuations in the LIBOR rate became more 
widespread in financia! operations carried out 
by private international banks. Since, as the 
experience of the past year showed clearly, 
fluctuations in the rate can reach very high 
levels, and since the new rates apply not only to 
new credits but also to loans taken out in the 
past, the practice in question gives rise to a 
considerable element of uncertainty with re-
gard to the level that debt servicing may reach 
in a given period. Moreover, as the base rate 
progressively accurately incorporates antic-
ipated inflation, the possibility of the real in-
terest rates charged on loans falling to very low 
levels, or even becoming negative, becomes 
less likely. 
A third adverse effect of the growing rela-
tive importance of private bank loans within 
overall external financing has been the reduc-
tion in the average length of time for repay-
ment . The imbalance between the periods of 
t ime required for adequate financing of devel-
opment programmes and investment projects 
—which often have long gestation periods— 
and the rather shorter periods of time that are 
characteristic of most loans granted by the 
international commercial banks has thus be-
come more pronounced. This discrepancy has, 
in turn, led to the need for constant res-
cheduling of loans already obtained, while the 
reduction of the average periods of time for 
repayment of debts has resulted in an addi-
tional debt-servicing burden. 
Lastly, the predominance of private 
sources of credit in the region's external 
financing is disadvantageous in that it encour-
ages use of criteria that are focused on private 
profitability, rather than social criteria, for the 
utilization of funds. As is well known, these two 
types of criteria can diverge considerably, par-
ticularly in countries that are endeavouring to 
implement new development strategies aimed 
at benefitting the poorer social sectors pre-
viously marginated from traditional economic 
growth. 
DEVELOPMENT AND EQUITY / Enrique V. Iglesias 37 
(e) The need to seek new forms 
of international financing 
The foregoing makes clear how urgent it is 
to seek new forms of international financing 
that make it possible to overcome, or at least to 
reduce , the current disadvantages of such 
financing. 
As we have already seen, following the 
first wave of increases in oil prices the inter-
national banking system carried out the process 
of recycling financial surpluses from the 
petroleum countries to the deficit countries 
fairly effectively. However, in view of the in-
crease in the imbalances in the developing 
countr ies ' external accounts and the steady and 
rapid increase in their external debt, it is 
reasonable to ask how likely it is that the insti-
tutions that make up the system in question 
will continue to play the role they have fulfilled 
so far. 
From certain points of view the prospects 
do not look particularly bad. On average, the 
private international banks' capital ratios do 
not appear to be imposing serious constraints 
on their loan operations, and the distribution 
of such operations between the industrialized 
countries and the developing countries will 
continue to depend on the relative profitability 
of granting loans to one or the other category of 
countries. Moreover, the volume of loans 
granted to the non-oil-exporting developing 
countries, as a proportion of the banks' gross 
assets held abroad, has remained at approxi-
mately 17% throughout the past decade. Last-
ly, in 1979 the outstanding bank debt of this 
group of countries (around US$ 190 billion) 
represented only 4% to 5% of the banks' total 
assets. 
However, the current system is not free of 
problems. On the one hand, a number of banks 
may be reaching certain technical limits in 
their relations with some countries. On the 
other hand, the level of the credits could 
exceed the debt-servicing capacity of a number 
of developing countries. Doubts —that should 
be given due consideration— are also often 
voiced with regard to the more or less effective 
use and final destination of the credits and their 
possible contribution to the promotion of ex-
cessive consumption instead of strengthening 
the investment process. 
In our view, tackling these problems will 
call for both a co-ordinated set of domestic 
macroeconomic policies and external fi-
nancing facilities that are in keeping with the 
dimensions of the problem that the developing 
countries must face. It should be pointed out, 
in this connexion, that a reduction in commercial 
financing is not the most appropriate way of 
solving the problems just mentioned either 
from the point of view of the borrowing coun-
tries —whose development programmes can 
be seriously affected by such measures— or 
from the point of view of the economies of the 
industrialized countries —which would be 
faced with a reduction in the dynamism of 
markets in the developing countries. Hence 
the urgent need to seek a more stable frame-
work for the transactions in question and, 
above all, to strengthen the role of public inter-
national financial institutions, particularly the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank 
and the regional banks. 
It is a question of giving these institutions a 
more active role in the recycling of funds so that 
they may supplement the role played by the 
commercial banks. The scale of the deficit 
countries ' financial requirements is such that, 
if effective adjustment policies are to be pro-
posed, the international financial agencies will 
have to be in a position to provide a consider-
ably greater volume of resources than they 
have supplied in the past. They will also have 
to adapt the terms of their financing to the 
longer periods of adjustment required by the 
deficit countries. Furthermore, these processes 
of adjustment cannot depend exclusively on 
the implementation of monetary and financial 
policies; they must be aimed at increasing the 
supply of resources and at further expanding 
the deficit countries' production base, and they 
must form part of a longer-term strategy 
designed to promote domestic saving, invest-
ment and growth. 
Of course, if the agencies in question are to 
step up their resources considerably, they will 
not only have to obtain a greater volume of 
loans from the governments of countries with 
surpluses or on the international financial 
markets; they will also have to devise new in-
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stitutional machinery to facilitate their prepa-
ration in the process of recycling the oil sur-
pluses. 
3. The energy transition 
T h e third of these major long-term concerns of 
the countries of the periphery is energy. We 
have pointed out on various occasions that the 
type of energy that mankind has chosen to use 
in recent decades has largely determined the 
development style of all the countries of the 
world. We have also pointed out that the so-
called 'energy crisis' prevailing since 1973 is 
not a transitory phenomenon, but a process 
that, on the one hand, marks the end of a stage 
in which growth was based on a high level of 
consumption of plentiful and cheap energy, 
especially petroleum, and, on the other hand, 
the beginning of a new era in which economic 
growth will be determined by the dual neces-
sity of reviewing the development styles that 
have prevailed until now, with a view to 
reducing energy consumption, and promoting 
development of new energy resources. 
It is important to consider this situation in 
all its dimensions, and not only in terms of its 
impact on the balance of payments of the petro-
leum-importing countries. Thus, firstly, we are 
facing a technical problem, since in the long 
term the crisis raises the problem of deciding 
what technological options mankind has in 
deal ing with the possible exhaustion of a 
source of energy that has until now been of 
fundamental importance in the energy balance. 
Secondly, we are facing an economic problem, 
because the viability of these technological 
options will depend on the cost of the alterna-
tive sources of energy, and because, in general, 
the cost of new sources of energy that could be 
used in the future will be much higher than that 
of the traditional sources of energy upon which 
mankind has based its development in the 
course of recent decades. Lastly, we are facing 
a political problem, since underlying the crisis 
is the fact that for the first time the developing 
world has organized itself in order to obtain 
the upgrading of the value of one of its basic 
resources, determining that, also for the first 
t ime, North-South relations shall be con-
sidered in terms of interdependence, rather 
than dependence . 
However, of the many aspects of the ener-
gy crisis, perhaps the most important is the 
uncertainty that this situation has created at the 
international level. If this uncertainty is to be 
reduced, an effort must be made to define those 
elements of the problem that are relatively 
foreseeable. 
To start with the production of hydro-
carbons is approaching limits that could mean 
that by the end of this century we shall be 
confronted with serious imbalances in supply 
and demand, with the danger of recurring 
periods of oil scarcity and growing vulnera-
bility of the international system with regard to 
the emergence of possible conflicts. 
Secondly, throughout this period oil prices 
will continue to rise until they reach levels at 
which it would be profitable to exploit alter-
native and currently more costly sources of 
energy. 
Thirdly, the phenomenon in question will 
continue to have a major financial impact. On 
the one hand, the increase in energy prices will 
continue to be a heavy financial burden for 
consumer countries. On the other hand, to the 
extent that energy prices rise faster than world 
inflation, the financial surpluses of the petro-
leum-exporting countries will continue to be 
an everyday phenomenon. Both situations 
mean that the international financial markets 
will, in general, maintain the volumes and 
levels of dynamism they reached in the past 
decade and that the challenge of facilitating 
redistribution of the surpluses in question will 
remain. 
Fourthly, higher energy prices will give 
rise to conservationist policies, which will, 
however, not solve the fundamental problems 
and whose results can only be assessed in the 
long term. Moreover, the margins within which 
the developing countries can reduce their 
energy consumption without jeopardizing 
their economic growth are much narrower than 
the margins affecting the industrialized world. 
Fifthly, the need to put into production 
hydrocarbon deposits for which extraction 
costs are higher than for those that have been 
exploited so far and to incorporate alternative 
sources of energy will call for extraordinary 
growth in the investments allocated to the 
development of this type of resources. The 
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investment required in order to incorporate the 
n e w technologies associated with such alterna-
tive sources of energy will also be considerable. 
Of course, these challenges will be a much 
harder blow to the oil-consuming developing 
countries, which have only a limited ability to 
increase their external revenue by expanding 
their export trade and whose consumption of 
energy per unit of the product, as already 
pointed out, is much more inelastic than in the 
case of the industrialized countries, owing, 
precisely, to the stages reached in their res-
pect ive development processes. 
I t is appropriate to recall, in this connexion, 
that the value of the oil imported by the coun-
tries of the periphery increased almost tenfold 
be tween 1970 and 1980, rising from a little over 
US$ 5 billion to approximately US$ 50 billion, 
and it is expected that the value of such imports 
will more than double again, in real terms, by 
the end of the current decade. Furthermore, 
these countries will have to allocate a growing 
proportion of their investment to the energy 
sector, with a view to reducing their depen-
dence on imported energy. On average, be-
tween 1966 and 1975 these countries invested 
approximately US$ 12 billion per year (in 1980 
dollars) in energy production and transforma-
tion, a figure that represents approximately 
5% of their total investment. However, it is 
estimated that in the periods 1981-1985 and 
1986-1990 these averages will reach US$ 54 
billion and US$ 82 billion, respectively. This 
will oblige the countries in question to revise 
their short and long-term investment plans, 
both in order to meet the greater cost of 
importing energy each year and in order to 
undertake the investment relating to the 
expansion of their domestic production of 
energy. 
T h e need to reconcile the allocation of a 
greater volume of financial resources to this 
sector and the implementation of policies to 
rationalize energy consumption with the task of 
achieving an acceptable rate of development 
faces these countries with tricky problems in 
the field of economic policy. Reconciling these 
conflicting factors will also depend, and to a 
very fundamental extent, on attitudes adopted 
in the sphere of international co-operation. 
All these questions are of great relevance 
in Latin America. Although the region's energy 
consumption is no more than 4% of world con-
sumption, its economic growth is closely 
linked with increasing energy availability, 
since energy use is concentrated in the produc-
tive sectors and not in the area of private con-
sumption, which means that there is little pos-
sibility of reducing consumption without 
jeopardizing economic activity. Moreover, 
unlike other regions of the world, replacement 
of conventional sources of energy has been 
limited in Latin America, where petroleum still 
accounts for 70% of total energy consumption, 
compared with 45% in the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, in most of the countries of 
the region consumption of petroleum has 
increased more rapidly than that of other 
sources of energy. Finally, for the oil-deficit 
Latin American countries oil imports represent 
a heavy financial burden, equivalent to 3% of 
their G D P and 26% of the total volume of 
imports of goods. 
Looking into the future, it may be expected 
that petroleum will continue to be the pre-
dominant source of energy for Latin America, 
despite the fact that proven oil reserves repre-
sent no more than 16% of the region's total 
energy reserves and are heavily concentrated 
in two countries —which means that it is ne-
cessary considerably to step up efforts relating 
to exploration for new deposits. In many 
countries of the region the potential for hydro-
electric power is greater than that of the oil 
reserves, bu t exploitation of this abundant 
renewable resource has as yet been very lim-
ited. The size of the coal reserves has not 
been determined with exactitude, but they are 
estimated as being more than three times the 
size of the total oil reserves, although their 
utilization would call for technologies permit-
t ing use of the low-energy-content coal existing 
in the region and, at the same time, minimizing 
the environmental impact of this fuel. Latin 
America has other potentially important energy 
resources, including uranium, heavy oils and 
bituminous shales and, in particular, the poten-
tial to be derived from biomass, which in some 
countries is expected to make a considerable 
contribution to the region's energy supply in 
the future. 
Development of these possibilities will 
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call for substantial investment. The total 
investment in petroleum, natural gas, coal, 
alcohol and electricity that the region will 
have to make in the period 1980-1990 has been 
estimated at between US$ 240 billion and 
US$ 280 billion, depending on the hypothesis 
selected for the economic growth rate. These 
figures represent an average volume of annual 
investment of between US$ 22 billion and 
US$ 26 billion in the course of the period in 
question, of which over half would represent 
expenditure in foreign currency. 
This investment effort calls for very large 
amounts of external resources, in addition to 
the heavy payments for oil imports anticipated 
for the current decade. It should be taken into 
account that by about 1990 such payments will 
represent between 6% and 7% of the GDP of 
the oil-importing Latin American countries, 
compared with 3% at the end of the past de-
cade, even if regional energy production ex-
pands rapidly. Any reduction in the planned 
levels of investment for this sector would give 
rise to an appreciable increase in oil imports, 
with the resulting impact on the balance of 
payments of the importing countries, while at 
the same time limiting their opportunities for 
economic growth. 
This complex panorama lends a disquieting 
note to the question as to what is to be done. 
We believe that the answer to that question 
lies in a combination of efforts at the national, 
regional and international levels. 
It emerges clearly from the considerations 
already mentioned that it is necessary for the 
countries of the region to continue to improve 
the policies tried out in recent years with a 
view to dealing with the various aspects of the 
energy crisis. Firstly, with regard to their im-
mediate external payments problems; second-
ly, as regards the introduction of strict policies, 
to rationalize energy use; thirdly, in the devel-
opment of energy resources, with emphasis on 
the incorporation of alternative sources of 
energy, and fourthly in the forecasting of 
requirements that will have to be met and 
changes that will have to be made in national 
investment plans in order to tackle the objec-
tives in question. 
Moreover, when considering these poli-
cies it is necessary to bear in mind the funda-
mental disparities to be observed in Latin 
America as regards the impact that the energy 
crisis has from country to country. These same 
disparities give rise to the need to start ener-
getic regional co-operation programmes in this 
field. The report submitted by the CEPAL Se-
cretariat at the current session suggests a 
number of courses of action in this conexión.16 
Among these courses are: the possibility of 
domestic enterprises pooling their efforts to 
conduct operations relating to prospection for, 
and exploitation of, new sources of hydrocar-
bons; harmonization of the external negotiating 
policies of the national petroleum companies 
with a view to increasing their weight in rela-
tion to third companies, including the possibil-
ity of conducting joint action in the field of fuel 
transport; and pooling of financial and techni-
cal resources for the construction of modern 
refineries. 
When these types of measures are being 
considered, regional co-operation in the field 
of oil supplies should not be relegated to a 
position of secondary importance; the program-
me initiated with the participation of Mexico 
and Venezuela to facilitate the provision of 
hydrocarbons to the Central American and Ca-
ribbean countries is both an example and a 
promising precedent in the field in question. 
Development of alternative sources of 
energy requiring the use of new technological 
experience is another favourable field in which 
regional co-operation programmes could be or-
ganized. The prospects for this are reinforced 
by the fact that considerable progress has been 
made in laying the technical, political and legal 
foundations for the development of co-opera-
tion programmes within the framework of the 
Latin American Energy Organization (OLADE), 
with direct participation on the part of the 
governments concerned. 
However, the magnitude of the challenges 
raised by the energy problem and the extent to 
which solution of these problems calls for co-
operation between producing and consuming 
countries —both developed and developing— 
make it necessary also to look for these solu-
16See Latin American development in the 1980s, 
E/CEPAL/G. 1150, February 1981 (mimeographed). 
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tions through international co-operation. Im-
plementat ion of energy conservation policies 
on the part of the industrialized countries 
would enable the Third World countries to in-
corporate more rational styles of energy con-
sumption into their development processes; 
such policies would, moreover, make it pos-
sible to save time and facilitate the transition to 
a n e w era based on the use of other sources of 
energy. With regard to the world supply of such 
resources, it is in the common interest of 
mankind that the vast unexploited potential 
that the developing countries have in this field, 
both as regards conventional sources and as 
regards new and renewable sources of energy, 
should gradually be used. The fact that there is 
a powerful shared interest in the field of energy 
provides a sound and promising basis for inter-
national co-operation. If this hope is to mate-
rialize, it is above all necessary to understand 
that lack of agreement in this field will lead to 
economic chaos and, what is even worse, most 
probably to political conflict. Secondly, the 
very existence of this shared interest should 
induce the international community to accept 
the developing countries' argument that it is 
not possible to conduct negotiations on the 
question of energy separately from other 
questions affecting their economic relations 
with the industrialized countries. Lastly, it 
must be recognized that international co-opera-
tion will only be productive if it is acknowl-
edged that there are responsibilities which, 
whi le they are uncumbent on the entire inter-
national community, are even more incumbent 
on the industrialized countries. Among these 
responsibilities is, above all, the need to find 
collective solutions to guarantee the oil sup-
plies of the various groups of countries. These 
responsibilities also include the handling of 
the balance-of-payments problems of the con-
sumer countries (particularly the developing 
countries) and the mobilization of the consid-
erable volume of resources required for the 
investment that must be made in energy. In this 
connexion, it should be borne in mind that, 
according to the declaration made by the Vien-
na Conference, technological progress is the 
common heritage of all mankind; a concept 
whose most urgent applications are precisely 
in the energy sector. 
4. Food security 
The last problem that I wish to refer to concerns 
food security. According to FAO figures, 15% of 
the Latin American population —approximate-
ly 50 million people— suffer from malnutrition, 
an assessment that may be considered conser-
vative, if account is taken of the fact that, ac-
cording to CEPAL's estimates, 19% of that pop-
ulation —approximately 63 million people— 
live in absolute poverty. The fact that the 
phenomenon of malnutrition is so widespread 
in Latin America is paradoxical, however, if the 
progress achieved in understanding the causes 
and magnitude of the food problem is taken 
into account. 
In general, food security relates to aggre-
gate world food availability, on which depends 
the possibility of implementing emergency 
measures, through the establishment of ap-
propriate minimun reserves, for the benefit of 
countries passing through critical situations. 
We believe that this concept should also cover, 
at the national level, measures to ensure that all 
members of the community have regular access 
to the food required in order to satisfy their 
basic needs and to develop their potential. 
Following the World Food Conference, 
concern with regard to such problems has 
grown and efforts to study them from various 
viewpoints have been redoubled. Such efforts 
have covered both nutritional questions proper 
and questions relating to food production and 
food resources. This has, in turn, led to the 
preparation of a wide variety of analyses and 
policies in this field, corresponding partly to 
the variety of approaches already mentioned 
and partly to the need to tackle at least some of 
the most serious aspects of the problem. 
Moreover, the disparities in the economic 
strategies adopted by the various countries 
of the region have led in some of them to high 
priority being accorded to achieving a greater 
degree all of self-sufficiency with regard to 
food, for reasons relating both to national secu-
rity and specifically to food, whereas in other 
countries the greater commercial and financial 
opennes of their economies has resulted in an 
incease in the imported component of their 
food supply. 
It may be said, without going into the ad-
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vantages and disadvantages of these two op-
tions, that it is unquestionable that the extent to 
which the two aims of achieving a greater 
degree of food self-sufficiency and acquiring 
cheap food through international trade should 
be combined is a basic problem that must be 
solved in the development strategies of the 
Latin American counüies. 
An integrative approach has recently 
emerged in Mexico which makes it possible to 
emphasize not only the most important compo-
nents of the food system, but also the chief 
interrelationships among them. The study 
conducted within the context of what is known 
as the Mexican Food System on the dynamic 
links between food production, importation, 
transport, distribution, allocation and con-
sumption has led to important political deci-
sions and to the adoption of simultaneous ac-
tion in a greater number of areas with a view to 
promoting steady improvement in the nutritio-
nal status of the poorest urban and rural sectors. 
It should also be borne in mind that current 
problems in Latin America relating to food se-
curity have two basic causes: instability in 
international trade in agricultural products, 
and, despite the progress made, the continuing 
inadequacy of both the modem and the tradi-
tional or peasant segments of the agricultural 
sector in many countries of the region. With 
regard to the first cause just mentioned, the 
well-known sharp fluctuations on international 
food markets should be borne in mind. For 
example, the 1973-1974 crisis on international 
food markets was the result of the convergence 
at that t ime of a number of factors, including the 
adverse climatic conditions that affected some 
of the principal production areas, the unprece-
den t purchases made by the Soviet Union, the 
considerable increases in the prices of petro-
leum and petroleum products, and the changes 
in the grain reserve policies of the United 
States and Canada. 
Among the chief consequences of that cri-
sis were a reduction in the tendency passively 
to accept growing external food dependence, 
and a trend towards more fundamental and 
careful analysis of how world supply networks 
operate. The latter led, in turn, to a more scep-
tical attitude towards the reliability of imports 
as a source of supply to supplement domestic 
production of basic foods. 
In part, these new attitudes are based on 
the realization that in addition to cyclical 
phenomena —which have such a great impact 
on the volume of food resources available at 
any given time— there is a phenomenon of a 
structural nature that is decisive in deter-
mining how the world market operates and is 
partly responsible for the fact that a couple of 
years of low production in the chief exporting 
countries produce severe shortages on the 
international market. We refer to the fact that 
both world supply and demand for cereals 
depend, apart from climatic variations, on the 
policies pursued by an extremely small num-
ber of developed countries. In addtion to this, 
there is the fact that, if the foreseeable gap 
be tween supply and the demand of the im-
porting countries is to be closed, the exporting 
countries will have to increase their production 
by at least 4% per year, whereas their historic 
rate of growth has been only 2.5% per year. 
The adverse consequences that this dis-
crepancy will have for prices are abundantly 
clear, particularly in the context in which the 
various formulas for multilateral regulation of 
food prices and stocks have not gained the 
international community's endorsement. 
However, even if it were possible to have 
available, through importation, the volume of 
supplementary food required in order to meet 
domestic needs, provision of access to such im-
ported products for the population groups 
whose food security is most at risk presents a 
series of problems that are extremely difficult 
to solve. This is why many Latin American 
countries are in the process of preparing strat-
egies aimed at achieving a greater degree of 
food self-sufficiency as a means of achieving a 
comprehensive solution to the problem in 
question and reducing the domestic impact of 
the shaip fluctuations that occur periodically 
on world food markets. 
In preparing such strategies, careful con-
sideration should also be given to the fact that 
in a number of Latin American countries agri-
culture is assuming an important role as a 
source of liquid fuels, and the implications 
this new role could have for the food supply 
should also be considered. Utilization of agri-
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culture simultaneously to produce food and 
energy crops raises questions that are as yet 
unanswered and gives rise to options that still 
have to be reconciled regarding allocation of 
agricultural resources, the make-up of the 
output in question, the variations that could 
occur in the relative prices of food, the tech-
nological innovations required, the length of 
t ime needed in order to produce liquid fuels 
commercially, and possible reductions in food 
production. 
These are therefore complex and difficult 
options, whose relative merits may differ great-
ly in the various countries of the region. 
At all events, at least two alternative ways 
of achieving food security in the context of a 
high level of self-sufficiency can be proposed: 
one based on the production sector composed 
of commercial agricultural enterprises and the 
other based on the broad peasant sector. As 
might be expected, these options have veiy 
different implications. 
In the first case, the various economic poli-
cy measures should be aimed at ensuring com-
petit ive rates of return on the cultivation of 
basic cereals and other essential foods, through 
mechanisms that are so well known it is un-
necessary to describe them here. The tools that 
can be used if it is desired to prevent these 
h igher rates of return from affecting the prices 
paid by the urban consumer for the products in 
quest ion are also extremely well known. 
In view of the relative dynamism that the 
modern sector has shown, and continues to 
show, in responding to the stimuli of effective 
demand, the desirable level of self-sufficiency 
could be reached in a relatively short period of 
t ime. However, a number of the problems 
arising from the type of modernization adopted 
by countiies that have taken this path would 
remain, particularly the inadequate share that 
the peasantry has in the benefits of a more 
m o d e m society, with the consequent implica-
tions for the peasantry's ability to acquire es-
sential goods, and the increasing use of tech-
niques that call for large-scale consumption of 
l iquid fossil fuels. 
In contrast, the strengthening of peasant 
agriculture represents an enormous challenge 
consisting of promoting a type of moderniza-
tion that incorporates and increases the ef-
ficiency of a great mass of small farmers who 
have considerable production potential. 
It is obvious that this path calls for more 
complex action and longer gestation periods 
—sometimes considerably longer— particular-
ly when fragmentation and decomposition pro-
cesses have affected a substantial portion of 
peasant agriculture. 
Implementation of this strategy also de-
pends on the characteristics of the peasant 
units, and this is worth emphasizing. Firstly, 
such units can upgrade —in other words, em-
ploy for socially productive purposes— resour-
ces that are marginal for or simply ignored by 
commercial agriculture; relatively unproduc-
tive tracts of land, redundant labour, and low-
cost, although also extremely low-productivity, 
means of production. Secondly, the energy 
inputs that peasant agriculture requires in 
order to operate are considerably lower than 
those required either directly or indirectly by 
commercial agriculture, Lastly, the level of 
intensification that can potentially be attained 
with regard to the use of labour is higher in 
peasant units than in commercial agriculture 
and results —use of other resources being 
equal— in generation of a greater product per 
employable person, even though the product 
per person effectively employed is actually 
lower, which is socially less important. 
The fact that this potential of peasant agri-
culture does not materialize —or does so inad-
equately— is due to the weak links between 
such agriculture and the rest of the economy 
and society in many countries. These links will 
therefore have to be strengthened substantial-
ly, if this option is to be viable. 
However, it is more likely that in practice 
individual countiies will in one way or another 
promote combinations of the two options in 
question and that they will seek to develop 
agriculture through simultaneous progress in 
peasant and commercial agriculture. Naturally, 
the extent to which each type of agriculture 
participates in, and contributes to, the overall 
development of agriculture will vary from 
country to country, according to the size and 
structure of each of its components and also 
according to the orientation of its national de-
velopment strategy. 
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IV 
Final observations 
In the preceding sections, I have tried to show 
some of the main traits which characterize the 
beginning of this decade. 
We have seen that in the international 
sphere , the present economic situation is dif-
ficult and uncertain and that loss of confidence 
is widespread. In these circumstances, protec-
tionism has tended to re-emerge in some of the 
industrialized economies and in a few of them 
there is a tendency for economic policy to be 
inward-looking instead of trying to overcome 
the current economic problems by effecting 
a more comprehensive and permanent reorgani-
zation of the international economy, in which 
the countries of the periphery, and the Latin 
American countries in particular, should play a 
greater role than in the past. 
We do not believe that this 'temptation to 
remain aloof ' is the best way to deal with the 
pressing problems we all now face. In particu-
lar, we think that a reaction of this kind would 
be frustrating for the countries of Latin Ameri-
ca, many of which have for some time been 
making enormous efforts to expand and diversi-
fy their exports and to open their economies up 
to international competition. If the response of 
the industrialized countries to these efforts 
were to increase tariff and quasi-tariff barriers 
to exports from the periphery and especially to 
the manufactures which are now being pro-
duced there on a competitive basis, the result 
would not only be harmful for the developing 
countries but in the last analysis would also 
obstruct the redeployment which must take 
place in the industrialized countries them-
selves if they are to regain a firm footing on the 
path to economic growth. 
At the regional level, Latin America is em-
barking on the new decade with a wider and 
more diversified production base and with 
richer and more varied experience of economic 
policy, but it also has unresolved problems of 
distribution and social inadequacies which 
must be surmounted as a matter of urgency. 
This task is, moreover, more pressing today 
than before because, as we have already pointed 
out, the region now has, at least from a purely 
economic point of view, greater capacity to deal 
with such problems than it had before. 
While it is true that the unfavourable inter-
national economic situation which now prevails 
puts serious hindrances in the way of this basic 
task, our forecast of the outcome is far from being 
pessimistic or catastrophic. In this sense, the 
way in which Latin America has tackled the 
energy crisis is significant, in that it reacted 
much more effectively to the problems caused 
by the crisis that had been assumed in the first 
analyses of the matter. Of course, its behaviour 
was to some extent facilitated by the increased 
external debt, which made it possible to effect a 
smoother and more gradual adjustment. But at 
the same time there can be no doubt that the 
region's greater ability to ward off the on-
slaughts of the external conjuncture also played 
a decisive role in this connexion. 
Thus, it is our heartfelt and firm conviction 
that it is our internal efforts which provide and 
must continue to provide the foundation on 
which our progress is built, and that it would be 
both mistaken and futile of us to think that all our 
problems spring from the adverse turn in the 
international scenario. 
Nevertheless, it would be absurd to ignore 
the fact that these upheavals have also had a 
decisive impact. In this connexion, we do not 
doubt that if the international community as a 
whole and the industrialized countries in par-
ticular made a genuine and persistent effort to 
change the present international division of 
labour and to establish a new and more equi-
table international economic order, the region 
would not only be able to overcome its present 
economic problems at a much lower social cost 
but a contribution would be made to the dyna-
mism and stability of the whole international 
economy, 
Even with an improvement in the relevant 
external factors, however, if the region wishes to 
achieve more dynamic and equitable develop-
ment in the course of this decade its task will not 
be easy, since in all our countries economic pol-
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icy must cope with complex and difficult cir-
cumstances. It would, of course, be vain on this 
occasion to try to cover the whole vast range of 
these problems since, as everybody knows, the 
variety of national situations and the diversity of 
the region are extreme. Nevertheless, there are 
common factors of some degree of relevance in 
the majority of our countries, to which we would 
like to draw attention. 
The first of these is the need for national 
economic policies to try to reconcile economic 
and social efficiency. In this connexion, the 
experience ofthe past has amply demonstrated 
both the imperative need for simultaneous prog-
ress in these two fields and the dangers of trying 
to advance rapidly in one of them while paying 
too little heed to the other. 
Latin America must view economic effi-
ciency with the urgency required by the difficult 
regional and world circumstances which now 
prevail. No country can overlook the imperative 
need for appropriate allocation and utilization of 
its human and productive resources and for the 
full development of its productive capacity. 
But it is not enough to ensure the efficient 
allocation and use of economic resources. It is no 
less vital that they should also be oriented in 
such a way as to satisfy the most pressing social 
needs. It follows that in the region progress 
along the path of economic efficiency must be 
accompanied by progress in the field of social 
efficiency. 
Both of these are, in our view, essential 
requirements . Thus, a policy which favoured 
social efficiency alone, without taking economic 
efficiency into account, might degenerate into 
distribution arrangements of a populist nature, 
which would not only fail to alter the deep 
causes of inequality and social deficiencies but 
would be transitory in their impact and easily 
overturned. In the same way, a policy which 
placed maximum emphasis on economic effi-
ciency without taking the social consequences 
of growth into account might cause tensions and 
frustrations to mount so that in time the effec-
t iveness and permanence of the economic 
model itself would be placed in jeopardy. 
In short, then, the reconciliation of eco-
nomic growth and the efficient use of resources 
on the one hand and an equitable distribution 
of the benefits ofthat growth on the other is one 
of the most complex but at the same time most 
vital tasks which the economic policy of our 
countries must tackle. 
A second basic field of action of economic 
policy is the modernization of the principal 
economic agents operating in the region, i.e., 
the State and private enterprise. 
In the first place, this task of modernization 
is essential in order to achieve that reconcilia-
tion of economic and social efficiency to which 
we referred previously. However, it also has 
another goal and is founded on another equally 
urgent principle: it must bring the region up to 
the level of the notable trans formations which 
have been initiated and will continue to be 
made in the world at large, especially in the 
fields of technology and energy. 
We are faced by a process of profound and 
rapid change in the technological sphere which 
has manifold courses and effects and which is 
begining to make itself felt in a wide variety of 
ways. In this connexion we have only to think 
o f the changes which will be brought about by 
the widespread use of microchips and the 'ro-
botization' of some industrial activities. 
Latin American private enterprise will 
have to face up to the effects of this very rapid 
process of technological change, and it is vital 
that it should make a vigorous and constant 
effort to modernize its forms of organization 
and methods of production. 
It is not only private enterprise that must 
b e modernized, however. No less important is 
the modernization of the State, which must 
bring its means and instruments of action up to 
date so as to meet as best it can the essential 
strategic objectives of ensuring a form of devel-
opment that is at once dynamic, fair and auton-
omous. 
In this regard it is well to recall once more 
that an increase in the size of the State is not 
necessarily synonymous with the efficiency of 
its action. Without failing to recognize the dif-
ferent role devolving on the public sector in 
each country—an aspect which falls within the 
exclusive field of decisions relating to the eco-
nomic model which each country has decided 
or may decide to adopt— it is necessary to insist 
that in a mixed-economy régime, such as that 
prevailing in the majority ofthe countries ofthe 
region, the public sector must seek the most 
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efficient forms of attaining its objectives and of 
ensuring that they will foster and not weaken 
the dynamism of private initiative. This is all the 
more necessary if account is taken of the mar-
ket's own limitations in solving some of the 
most pressing social problems, in the solution 
of which State action is absolutely vital. 
Lastly, the third common factor which must 
be considered in some form by all national 
policies is that of integral development. 
T h e United Nations, in its definition of 
integral development and in the International 
Development Strategy, and CEPAL, in its ap-
praisals of the latter throughout the past decade, 
have laid particular stress on the need to view 
economic development in a broad social per-
spective. It would be impossible to conceive of 
a growth effort which was not in the last in-
stance directed at achieving social ends which 
will permit men to realize themselves, to the full 
spiritually and materially. This is why one of the 
main queries existing at this moment of deep-
seated changes and notorious and generalized 
uncertainty prompts us to ask ourselves once 
again concerning the ultimate objectives of the 
society we are aspiring to build up and the role 
of the average Latin America in it. 
In our opinion, despite the upheavals and 
confusion which characterize the times we live 
in, these objectives continue to be the same as 
those which this institution has recommended 
since the beginning, i.e., the achievement of a 
development which, at the same time as it cre-
ates more goods and services in the material 
sphere, permits the participation of all indi-
viduals in building the society in which they 
have to live and ensures not only the equitable 
distribution of the results of progress, but also 
liberty, as the supreme milieu in which there 
can be self-realization for all. 
It is fundamentally towards the achieve-
ment of these permanent objectives, consonant 
with the region's best ideals, that we consider 
that the efforts of all our peoples and all their 
leaders should be directed on a systematic and 
constant basis. 
